THE SIX SYSTEMS
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

by
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PREFACE

I conceived the idea of writing this book while I was at Harvard to participate in the Harvard International Seminar. Some of the participants in the seminar evinced a keen interest in the history of Indian philosophy. We had quite a few informal meetings. I am now putting those discourses in the form of a book. Naturally a book like this will have its shortcomings. The absence of diacritical marks will be a serious handicap.

This book professes to be no more than a description of some of the salient points of each of the six systems of Indian philosophy. It does not claim to be exhaustive. It is calculated to appeal to the beginners and to arouse their curiosity in the subject. I hope that this plain presentation of the fundamental tenets of the six systems of Indian philosophy will be superseded by a more comprehensive examination of Indian philosophy.

I am indebted to Shri Hiriyanna, Shri Jadunath Sinha, Dr. Radhakrishnan and other reputed writers on Indian Philosophy on whose writings I have relied I would like to thank Professor G. G. Kewalramani my senior colleague of the department of philosophy,

and Professor C. M. Kulkarni, my friend and colleague, for their helpful interest.

I shall never be able to express adequately my indebtedness to my teacher, Principal, S. V. Dandekar for his never-failing encouragement. Without his help this book could never have been written.

I have done my best, little as it may be, and my best reward will be if a new interest shall spring in the mind of a reader to read more about Indian philosophy.

N.D.R.

Bombay,
Magha, Shuddha Chaturthi,
Shake 1880.

CONTENTS

		Page
	Introductory	1
Chapter		
I.	The Nyaya Darshana	29
II.	The Vaisesika Darshana	61
III.	The Samkhya Darshana	79
IV.	The Yoga Darshana	97
V.	The Mimamsa Darshana	111
VI.	The Vedanta Darshana (Sankara and Ramanuja)	130

INTRODUCTORY

The story of Indian philosophy is a long one, though full of human interest, a little difficult to tell. In the distant past, that story was told again and again by the teachers animated by a spirit of dedication to the devoted students with whom pursuit of truth was a passion. Through recitals its contents percolated to all strata of society. It was the story that explained Reality, Meaning and Purpose of life. It exhorted the people to think clearly; act effectively and live decently.

The earliest records of the story of the most profound knowledge and the highest wisdom are contained in the hymns of Rigveda, in the later Samhitas, the Brahmanas and the Upanishads, the Epics, the books of Ethics, Justice and Laws. The message of their teachings reached to the distant lands of China and Japan; South East Asia, Persia, Central Asia and Greece. Like all great philosophies, philosophy in India began in reflections on the problem of human existence, the place of man in the universe, the meaning and purpose of life. But in thrashing out these problems, it always pointed out beyond intellectual satisfaction.

One who tells the story of Indian philosophy is always confronted with the initial difficulty of the absence of any biographical background. Neither the Vedic Rishis nor the later Darshankaras wrote anything about themselves. The relevant dates for determining the chronological development of philoso-

phies in India are shrouded in the unknown depths of the past. The only date that can be accepted as almost settled is the one that fixes the death of Buddha in 487 B.C. On that basis we may broadly divide the history of Indian philosophy into two periods, the Vedic period and the classical period. The traditional texts that are regarded as "revealed" belong to the first period, though they seem to have been collected in the latter part of the period. The art of writing does not seem to be prevalent then. Hence the method of communication was oral transmission. These collections can not be regarded as systematic and as such they need systematic interpretation. As compared to the Vedic period, the classical period appears to be more systematic. But even during this period, the method of oral transmission was not given up; and it is likely that the earlier teachings must have undergone a considerable change. We can hardly go beyond 500 B.C. and it becomes necessary to divide the classical period into the early classical and the later classical one. It is to this latter period that belongs the "golden age of the system". Roughly speaking the duration of this period is from 500 B.C. to the early century of the Christian era. This period is a distinct stage in the growth of Indian thought.

In relation to the six systems of Indian philosophy, the Upanishads play a vital role. It is from the Upanishads that the founders of the systems draw their inspiration. They represent "a large Manasa

lake of philosophical thought" from which each thinker draws for his own purposes. They are the cream of philosophical thought in India. They are regarded as the embodiment of the highest truth. Etymologically, the word Upanishad means "sitting near devotedly". It signifies the instructions concerning the highest truth imparted by the learned teacher to his disciple. They are actually very terse discourses on philosophy in its widest possible sense.

The origin of the Upanishad is shrouded in a mystery. Traditionally, they are regarded as "revealed" just like the Mantras and the Brahmanas which are prior to the Upanishads in order. They contain in a nutshell, the conclusions of philosophical discourses revealing the truth in its diverse forms. They mark the culmination of Vedic teachings. There are about two hundred and more Upanishads. The Upanishads are admittedly the basis of one of the systems of Indian philosophy, viz. the Vedanta.

The Upanishads evolve a world-view which is reflected in the six different tributeries that we call the six systems of Indian philosophy. The Upanishads revolve round the concept of "Brahman" and "Atman". The Brahman is the great acosmic principle from which the world follows and to which it finally returns. The Brahman is the underlying reality that appears as the manifold world. "Truth is one; sages call it variously." Etymologically, Atman means vital breath, and hence it stands for the true being of anything. More particularly in case of man

it signifies his self or soul. The Brahman is the true nature of reality; Atman is the true nature of man. Everything in this universe must move towards the realization of the nature of its true being. From lower forms to higher, the world-process inexorably moves to bring about the culmination of the purpose of creation. The Brahman in the form of Atman is immanent within man. The reunion of Atman with Brahman becomes the crowning grace of life. The concept of Moksha symbolises this law of fulfilment. But this fulfilment is not brought about by any philosophy of escapicism. It demands a positive approach to reality. In developing this approach to reality the Upanishads speak with double voice. They sometimes refer to the Brahman as cosmic, an all inclusive one; in some other contexts the Brahman is referred to as acosmic, an all exclusive one. There arises a need to resolve such apparent contradictions in them. Hence the justification for the six systems of Indian philosophy. They elaborately interprete the core of Upanishadic teachings and try to resolve the apparent contradictions therein by spotlighting the truth from their own particular standpoint. Philosophy is "Darshana", a vision of truth. Thus there arise the logical realism of Nyaya, the atomic pluralism of Vaisesika, the evolutionary dualism of Shamkhya, the theism and moralism of Yoga, the absolute monism of Vedanta, the ritualistic polytheism and partial pragmatism of Mimamsa. But even in their diversified interpretations of truth, these system do not lose sight of the ultimate truth —

the law of fulfilment. Without the One Real Being nothing that exists in our knowledge could exist, neither our soul nor the world of objects around us. To have this one Real Being as a part and parcel of our experience is the realization of our own true being and towards this ideal all our efforts should be directed. As such philosophy becomes a way of life. Clear thinking and clean living are the sine qua non of that way of life. This is amply brought out by one of the fundamental tents of Jainism, viz. "Do not live to know, but know to live"

Every student of Indian philosophy is bound to be impressed by the spirit of tolerance and unflinching devotion to truth shown by the Indian philosophers in their pursuit of truth. Max Muller pays a fitting tribute to their sterling qualities when he says, "what I admire in Indian philosophers is that they never try to deceive us as to their principles and the consequences of their theories. If they are idealists, even to the verge of nihilism, they say so, and if they hold that the objective world requires a real, though not necessarily a visible or a tangible substratum, they are never afraid to speak out." The Samkhya of Kapila is a shining example of this type of attitude. Kapila refuses to foist an active God into his philosophy merely to escape the damaging charge of atheism. Again Sankara never shirked the conclusion of consigning God to the limbo of appearance. And both of them were listened to with respect and an open mind by their adversaries It is needless to say

how badly we are in need of developing this attitude in the strife-torn-propoganda-governed world of today that is about to destroy itself on the issue of ideologies. Fidelity to truth and not loyalty to dogmas, should be the guiding principle of life.

It is necessary to remove one misconception about Indian Philosophy. A charge is levelled against Indian philosophy that despite the susbstantial differences among the various schools, they agree in teaching renunciation. Such teachings sap our energies and make us indifferent to the material benefits of life. Such views have done incalculable harm to Indian philosophy. It is depicted as a system developing an attitude of "revulsion and neglect". Hence it is described as other worldly. Such a view is a gross distortion of Indian philosophy. It is true that the systems of Indian philosophy preach renunciation, but its basis is "ashrama vyavastha". Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan has said, "The Ashramadharma attempts to fill the whole life with the power of spirit". Renunciation is prescribed only to a few and not one and all. It is not true that every one must renounce this world as a condition precedent to the realization of one's own true being. Every one in this universe is a member of the co-operative world order and the actions of everyone must be conducive to the benefit of that co-operative order. Thus leading one's life in response to the call of paramount duties incidental to one's station in life is also a method of working out one's way towards the ideal of self-

realization. It is significant to observe that even a sanyasi has certain duties to perform. The Law of Dharma (Duty) and the Law of Karma (Action) are the two pillars on which the edifice of Indian philosophy is erected. Dharma is defined as "Dharmo Vishvasya Jagatah Pratishtha". Dharma is the mainstay of the entire universe. One who runs away from the world runs away from his true nature. As the Bhagvad Gita puts it succinctly, "Man does not win freedom from action by abstaining from it; nor by mere renunciation does he rise to perfection".

Salient Features:

Philosophy has been defined as "Love of wisdom". In this sense, philosophy in India, was never considered as merely an intellectual understanding of the world around us. It was a search after truth and the whole of truth. Hence the seeker after truth would not remain satisfied until he had himself a revelation of truth.

By and large, philosophy in the West has been guided by theoretical or speculative interests. It tries to describe a world-view depicting the nature of Reality. It endeavours to develop different theories about Nature, Soul and God. And in these attempts the western philosophy is not guided by spiritual motives. In India, on the other hand, philosophy arose out of practical needs. Deep and sober reflections on the problems pertaining to human existence and the

scheme of values convinced every Indian philosopher that philosophy must be a way of life and not merely a piece of speculation. Philosophy must aim at the vision of truth, since only by such vision that man can bring about an end of all the conditions of misery. Naturally, philosophy in Indian began as a rational investigation into the nature and extent of human experience and knowledge, and ended on the note of liberation (Moksha) which end was sought as the Summum Bonum of life.

It is obvious that Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual in its outlook. There is an intimate connection between philosophy and religion. But one has to be careful to note what religion connotes. For religion in this connection does not convey a set of dogmas but a living experience of man's communion with the highest Reality. Each system of philosophy will no doubt develop a theory of Reality. But every philosopher will try to have an insight into the nature of reality. In the words of Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy is "a way of life, an approach to spiritual realisation".

Philosophy is significantly called **Darshana** in India. Darshana means a vision; and philosophy is **darshana** since it is the vision of reality. The Indian philosophers corroborate their conclusions with the conclusions of the Vedas. This acceptance of the authority of the Vedas has been grossly misunderstood so as to dub Indian philosophy as being dogmatic.

Such a view is a gross misrepresentation of the nature of Indian philosophy. Submission to the authority of the Vedas is submission to truth, since the Vedas embody the intuitions of truth. Reasoning no doubt is useful and valuable but it cannot take precedence over intuition. In this sense the authority of the Vedas is not arbitrary. Every Indian school holds in its own way that there can be a direct realisation of trtuh. (Tattva-darshana).

Indian philosophy is distinctly marked by a certain Catholicity of outlook. This Catholic spirit led to the development of a distinct method of philosophy. The different stages of this method were: (1) Purvapaksha, i.e. the statement of the opponent's case, (2) Khandana, i.e. the refutation of the opposition, (3) Uttarapaksha, i.e. the statement of one's own case and the arguments in support of it and finally (4) Siddhanta, i.e., the statement of the final conclusion. The Catholic spirit of treating the adversary with due respect and consideration led to a certain free flow of ideas and openness of mind. The spirit of tolerance is the greatest virtue of Indian philosophy.

The Six Sytems:

Though philosophy in India drew from the common reservoir of thought, it neither stifled the freedom of thought nor did it stunt its growth. Each philosopher tried to develop his own conclusions and offered his own reasons in support of them. As a result there arose several

systems which were aligned together on account of their minimum of common approach.

According to one of the traditional principles of classification, the schools of Indian philosophy are classified into two broad categories of orthodox (Astika) and heterodox (Nastika). These words normally convey a division of thinkers into 'theists' and 'atheists'. But this is not the meaning implied when they are used to denote schools of Indian philosophy.

Orthodox systems are those which accept the authority of the Vedas, whereas, the heterodox systems are those which reject it. To the former group belong the **'Shaddarshanas'**, the six systems of Indian philosophy. They are the systems of Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa and Uttar Mimamsa i.e. Vedanta. To the latter group belong the three systems of Charvakas, Buddhism and Jainism. These three systems do not accept the authority of the Vedas.

Even among the orthodox systems we come across systems which heavily rely on the authority of the Vedas. Purva Mimamsa is one of such systems. It emphasises and upholds the ritualistic aspect of the Vedas and is thus directly dependent upon it. Whereas there are other systems, such as the different schools of Vedanta which emphasise the speculative aspect of

the Vedas. All the orthodox systems, however, are agreed that wherever reasoning falls short of explaining a problem, the verdict of the Vedas embodying revealed truths must be relied upon. The aforesaid classification is thus based on the difference in the methods of speculation.

Sabdapramana :

The place of Authority of the Vedas in the six systems of Indian Philosophy needs some more elucidation. All the schools of Indian philosophy regard certain means of knowledge as valid. Pramana literally means "A means of knowledge", and Sabda means, 'testimony as a valid means of knowledge'. Sabda is literally the testimony of the trustworthy person. It is a statement uttered by a person who knows the truth and communicates it correctly. "A reliable person is one who is in the habit of speaking the truth". Testimony is always personal and depends upon the reliability of the person who communicates that testimony. This testimony may be of perceptible objects or of imperceptible objects such as God, Soul, Absolute etc.

Sabdapramana in Indian philosophy indicates scriptural (Vedic) testimony. The Scriptures, i.e. the Vedas are regarded as created by God. (Apauruseya). As such the truths that they embody are perfect and infallible. The source of the Vedas not being human, its testimony is regarded as beyond

error. As such, in matter of knowledge of all imperceptible objects, the testimony of the Vedas is regarded as final. Thus Sabdapramana indicates in its stricter and narrower sense an appeal to the authority of the Vedas.

The classification of the systems of Indian philosophy into orthodox and heterodox raises an important question as to the place of Sabdapramana in Indian philosophy. The distinction between orthodox and heterodox ultimately boils down to the supremacy of intuition over reason. The Vedas are regarded as revealed truths. And all the six systems of Indian philosophy incline towards upholding the truth of a revelation, i.e. Tattvadarshna.

In philosophy the ultimate questions, such as, "What is God ?" "Is there a Soul ?" "In what way is God and the Soul related ?", lie beyond the scope of ordinary observation and proof by demonstration. These problems are intimately connected with a certain kind of living experience. Reason which is always analytic is incapable of leading the seeker after truth to the promised land. We cannot with the help of bare reason form any correct idea about either God or Soul or liberation. And hence we should depend for such ideas on the trustworthy experience of the seers who have had a direct realisation of truth, i.e., sakshatkar. The Mimamsa and the Vedanta schools in particular adopt this approach. The other four

systems regard Sabdapramana as one of the valid means of knowledge and as such do not heavily rely upon the authority of the Vedas though in the final analysis it is acceptable to them.

In recognising Sabdapramana, the Indian philosophers, far from being dogmatic, have shown a tendency to realise the limits of reason. Unfortunately, this realisation is misconstrued as dogmatism and disparagement of reason. However, a dispassionate analysis of the independent methods by which the Indian thinkers arrived at their conclusions, will explode the myth of that charge.

Dogmatism and Pessimism :

Every student of Indian philosophy is confronted with the charges of dogmatism and pessimism which are levelled off and on against it. The charges are very serious and as such will require a closer examination of the attitude of Indian thinkers of the past as it is revealed in their systems.

Many Western critics as well as some of their Indian counterparts have often dubbed Indian philosophy as being dogmatic. This charge rests on their contention that by and large, the systems of Indian philosophy accept the authority of the Vedas and always appeal to it even in matters of minor importance. Such a belief in the infallibility of the Vedas tantamounts to dogmatism. Apparently the charge holds good, since, it is a fact that the Indian

philosophers accept 'Sabdapramana'. But on deeper reflections it will be found that the charge of dogmatism can not be sustained.

In plain language, dogmatism means uncritical acceptance of certain dogmas. In this connection it is significant to remember that dogmatism rests on an arbitrary authority, since it is uncritically accepted. The Authority of the Vedas is not to be regarded as arbitrary After due and critical discussion the Indian thinkers came to the conclusion that "revealed truths" i.e. intuitive truths are to be preferred to reasoned statements. Reasoning has limits of its own, but it is possible to probe into the nature of truth by means of knowledge which is superior to reason in respect of its efficacy. And the Vedas contain such intuitive truths which therefore, have got to be believed. The Acceptance of the authority of the Vedas is thus based not on their uncritical assumption, but on a kind reasoned faith in them. This is far from being dogmatic.

We may pose another important question. Did the reference to the Vedas at any time stifle the freedom of thought among the Indian philosophers ? I am afraid, not. The fact that the Samkhya system, even though an orthodox one, considers God as unnecessary or the fact that Nyaya and the Samkhya systems develop Asatkaryavada and Satkaryavada respectively are enough pieces of evidence, if evidence were needed to show that each system arrived at its conclusions independently by a reasoned and logical

process. And they sought to strengthen their conclusions by showing that their independent conclusions corroborate the revealed truths. The Vedas thus become an additional source of strength to them. This varied development of Indian systems on independent lines hardly drives home the charge of dogmatism.

All Indian philosophers have been charged with pessimism, and in some cases such a charge may seem well founded, but not in all. Max Muller, in his Indian Philosophy, has said, "Indian philosophers are by no means dwelling for ever on the miseries of life. They are not always whining and protesting that life is not worth living. This is not their pessimism. They simply state that they had received the first impulse to philosophical reflection from the fact that there is suffering in the world. They evidently thought that in a perfect world suffering had no place." Consequently it became clear that anything that failed to annihilate suffering could not be accepted as perfect, however, attractive it might appear. Pain is certainly an imperfection. And it raised a fundamental question as to why it existed at all and how it could be annhihilated. This is not as Max Muller rightly observes, "disposition which we are accustomed to call pessimism".

We may rest assured with the belief that the Indian philosophy contains 'no outcry against divine injustice and in no way encourages suicidal expedients'.

The spirit of Indian philosophy and the precept of the Indian philosophers militate against any pessimistic outlook on life. Sankara who died at the age of 32, moved throughout the length and breadth of India preaching Vedanta and placing Hinduism on its **terra firma.** Consider how much he achieved in the shortest span of life and with what consummate skill ! Can a pessimist ever achieve even a fraction of that ? A pessimist is ill-equipped for self-conquest and self-realisation.

A charge of pessimism against Indian philosophy is born out of certain preconceived notions and superficial reading of Indian philosophy. The Indian thinkers, recognised the fact of suffering and yearned for a permanent and not temporary remedy against it. They profess their ability to remove pain, the source of which is nescience. They all insist on finding out the ways and means to bring about the cessation of all pain. Such a philosophy can hardly be called pessimistic in the ordinary sense of the word. The cause of suffering is discovered within ourselves. This recognition of a stark reality has been misunderstood by the critics of Indian philosophy who style it as pessimistic. However, the truth as we have seen is different.

Indian philosophy may appear as pessimistic because it appears to be "working under a sense of discomfort and disquiet at the existing order of things". As remarked by Chatterjee and Datta,

"pessimism in Indian systems is only initial and not final". It does not paint a false picture of life to give us a false sense of security. However, it distinctly ends on a note of optimism in as much as it affirms "spiritualism" which is an affirmation of eternal moral order. Sankara's jivanmukti is the last word on optimism. How then can Indian philosophy be called pessimistic ?

Ethical Motive :

The first impulse to philosophical speculation in India arises out of a certain spiritual disquietude. It is but a natural desire dwelling in the hearts of men to seek happiness. Reflection on human life indicates that it is invariably accompanied by suffering. Hence it becomes imperative to ask such questions as "By what means can we bring about the cessation of pain ?". "Is there a way to achieve lasting happiness ? Questions such as these were the first and the foremost in the minds of Indian philosophers. And the pursuit of philosophical studies was regarded as a necessary preparation for liberation which became the **Summum Bonum** of life.

The six systems of Indian philosophy are thus wedded to a belief in an ideal of eternal moral order and the respective philosophies offer guidance to reach that ideal. This is the ethical motive that permeates each and every system of Indian philosophy. In the words of Datta and Chatterjee, "Barring the

solitary exception of the Charavak materialists, it is the common atmosphere of faith (in an eternal moral order) in which all these systems, Vedic and Non-vedic, theistic and atheistic move and breathe".

This faith in moral order takes different forms in different systems :

In the Nyaya system we are introduced to the theory of Adrsta, the unseen principle which has a sway even over the material atoms and it shapes objects and events in accordance with moral principles. The Nyaya system proposes at the very outset to give us knowledge of reality or realities which will enable us to attain self-realisation. Closely allied with the Nyaya system is the Vaisesika system which is a thorough-going pluralistic realism. It traces the world to the combination of innumerable atoms of different kinds. But the creation of the world out of eternal atoms in eternal time is subject to the divine order. It has a reference to the moral life of an individual soul. It is the moral destiny that shapes not only our ends but all ends. This amply illustrates the ethical motive of the Nyaya and Vaisesika.

The Samkhya system though outwardly atheistic, its dominant motive is to attain freedom from suffering. Suffering is the result of a wrong identification on the part of Purusa with Prakrti. Hence it advocates self-culture for the attainment of liberation.

It is significant to note that the Samkhya thinkers believe in a stage where the evolution comes to an end and the three Gunas collapse into the bosom of Prakrti to reside there in a state of equilibrium. Coming together of Prakrti and Purusa can not be explained unless a reference is made to the faith in an eternal moral order. Evolution in Samkhya system is out and out teleological. And all these considerations point out the ethical motive of the Samkhya system.

The Yoga system is predominantly an ethical system. The Ashtanga Yoga i.e. the eight-fold path prescribed by Patanjali is nothing else but physical and mental preparation for launching a career in spiritualism. Yoga is intensely ethical in motive. And it redounds to the credit of Patanjali that all other systems accept his moral code, which is designed to make men perfect physically, mentally, morally and spiritually.

As regards, the Purva Mimamsa, the concept of Apurva, the law that guarantees the future enjoyments of the fruits of rituals performed now, is a clear indication to the ethical motive of that system. In the earlier Mimamsa, the conception of liberation appears to be the attainment of heaven where there is unalloyed bliss.

The studies of Vedanta philosophy may initially create a doubt in the mind of a student whether there is any room for ethics in the Advaita Vedanta. Super-

ficially, he may even come to a negative conclusion. But his first impressions will surely be not the last. For if there ever was a system with an ethical motive as its dominant note, it was the system of Sankara. For Sankara lays down rigorous qualifications for the attainment of Brahmavidya and positively assures that liberation is not something to be achieved in a hypothetical hereafter, but it is a state of bliss (Anand) to be enjoyed here and now. It is this positive ideal that makes the system intensely ethical.

A closer examination will thus reveal that all the six systems of Indian philosophy are inspired by ethical motives. Dr. Dasgupta rightly speaks of the "unity of Sadhana" among different schools of Indian philosophy. They lay different stress on different aspects of ethical life.

The Common Characteristics ;

Even a cursory glance at the six systems of Indian philosophy will suffice to prove that they have all drawn from the common reservoir of thought. Like different rivers flowing from the common spring but flowing in different directions, the six systems have sprung from a common bed—the Vedas —but have developed on different lines. Arising out of a common source they carry forward many common ideas, which is a distinctive feature of Indian philosophy. These common ideas may be briefly told

In spite of their differences, the six systems of Indian philosophy have the following ideas in

common : (1) The reality and the immortality of Atman, i.e. Soul; (2) Samsara, i.e. Metempsychosis; (3) The Law of Karma; (4) The Ideal of Liberation; (5) Belief in the authority of the Vedas; and finally, (6) The Pramanas. To these six common ideas, Dr. Jadunath Sinha has rightly added one more and that is (7) Ethical Discipline.

All the orthodox schools believe in the existence of soul, though their conceptions of it differ. Thus, the Samkhya, Nyaya and Vaiseka thinkers together with the Mimamsakas may believe in the plurality of selves, whereas, Sankara may be advocating the identity of the soul and Brahman. Nevertheless they all believe in soul. The Nyaya, Vaisesika and the Mimasa hold that the Atman is a knower, an enjoyer and an agent. It is an eternal infinite substance. Vedanta holds that atman is pure being, pure consciousness, pure bliss (sadchidanand). To the Samkhya thinkers, the Atman i.e. Purusa is an eternal, infinite substance, its essence being consciousness. However it is inactive.

Max Muller thinks that the idea of immortality of the soul also should be included in what was the common property of all Indian philosophers. The idea is simply taken for granted and hence no elaborate arguments are offered to prove it. As he puts it, "immortality of the soul sounds almost tautological".

Closely linked up with immortality of the soul is the common idea of Metempsychosis. It refers

to the transmigration of the soul from one birth to another. Mortality is a quality of the body, but the soul after leaving one body enters another and this cycle of birth and rebirth goes on until the soul attains liberation. As Jadunath Sinha observes, Samsąra (i.e. Metempsychosis) is "a beginningless series of births and deaths." This bondage is an outcome of ignorance. With the dawn of right knowledge of Reality, the shackles of bondage begin to break, and with it ends Samsara. Thus the inevitable conclusion : ignorance is bondage; knowledge is liberation. Death is merely the dissolution of body and hence does not imply cessation of suffering. Right knowledge alone and not death can remove all suffering. Thus the theory of Samsara is based on the belief in continuity of the soul.

What then causes the soul to carry on with another garb ? What is it that is responsible for the continuity of this cycle of birth and rebirth ? The obvious answer given by all the six systems is, the Law of Karma. This belief in the inevitable law of Karma seems to be ingrained in the minds of Indian philosophers. It means "All work, good or bad, all must bear and do bear fruit". The conception of **Rta** in Rigveda is the germ plasm of the Law of Karma. Rta means the inevitable physical and moral order. The unity between the two is achieved by saying that the physical laws are the expression of a divine will which follows the moral law. The entire universe is based on Rta and moves in it. The Upanisads conceive the Law of Karma as an eternal moral order.

As we sow, so shall we reap. Birth and its conditions are necessitated by one's own deeds, good or bad. The Law of Karma is a curious mixture of freedom and determinism. Every man is free to act, but not free to choose the consequences of his acts. Every deed produces its effect in the world and so also a disposition (i.e Sanskara or Vasana) in the mind of the person who acts. The particular dispositions subsisting in the mind of a person at the time of his death, become the basis of yet another life for him. Such dispositions are generated through excessive attachment. Thus Karma has a cosmic as well as psychological aspect. And in the final analysis, the physical order is governed by the moral order.

The idea of metempsychosis logically implies the idea of liberation. Hence it assumes the unique importance in the six systems of Indian philosophy. As A. B. Keith aptly put it, "Liberation is the corner stone of Indian metaphysics". With a solitary exception of the Charvakas, almost every Indian system advocates the urgency of liberation. If there is bondage, there must be some way to set the one in bondage free. As such it is the ignorance that binds, and knowledge that liberates.

In this connection it is quite significant that each system of philosophy in India is described as 'Darshna'. The six systems are called 'Saddarshanas'. Darshana literally means 'sight' and figuratively may be taken to indicate that what the Indian seers aspired after in

philosophy, was not a mere mediate knowledge of the ultimate truth but a direct vision of it. As rightly observed by Professor Hiriyanna, "the distinguishing feature of Indian philosophy in general is its insistence that one should not rest content with a mere intellectual conviction but should aim at transforming such conviction into direct experience". As such the right type of knowledge one acquires by philosophical studies assumes immense practical value. For knowledge is a liberating force. Accordingly liberation i.e. Moksha plays a vital role in the Indian philosophy.

The Nyaya and the Vaiseshika thinkers conceive liberation as a state of negation, a complete and absolute cessation of all pain and suffering. Apavarga as they describe it, is complete freedom from pain. The soul in this state is released from the connections with the body and the senses. So in liberation the soul exists as a pure substance free from fear, change or decay. And to attain this stage the knowledge of Nyaya is required. It is the ultimate end of Nyaya.

The Samkhya and the Yoga thinkers hold that non-discrimination between purusa and Prakrti is the root cause of bondage and the Samkhya i.e. right knowledge or discrimination between the two, liberates purusa. Liberation here does not mean movement of the soul from less perfect to more perfect condition. The attainment of liberation means just a recognition of the self as a reality, beyond space and time & above

mind and body. On the attainment of such condition the self is freed from the vicissitudes of life. That is the highest end to be achieved.

According to the earlier Mimamsakas the attainment of heaven was the highest reward for performing rituals and it gave unalloyed bilss. However, later on the idea of liberation replaces that of heaven. The soul in this state is free from all Karma-ties. It amounts to stoppage of rebirth. Disinterested performance of rituals culminates in liberation.

The Vedantins regard liberation as the realisation of the identity between the soul and the Brahman. In bondage, the soul wrongly identifies itself with the body. Its true nature is quite different. Hence, Jivan mukti leads to the realisation of Brahmanhood of the self. To the Vedantins of Sankara's view, liberation is jivanmukti. It is enjoying brahmanand. It is a positive state of mind which enjoys bliss at the realisation of the identity between the soul and the ultimate Reality. It is the vision of the truth that 'I am Brahman'. That is the highest truth. Thus it will be observed that the concept of moksha varies from system to system, but it marks the culmination of philosophical culture.

The Nyaya and Vaisesika conceive liberation as the pure existence of soul free from connections with mind and body. The Mimamsakas conceive it as the realisation of the intrinsic nature of the soul free

from pleasure and pain. The Sankhya and Yoga thinkers view it as the realisation of discrimination between purusa and prakrti. Liberation, in short, is soul's return to its natural condition.

All systems of Indian philosophy recognise the authority of the Vedas. However, this acceptance is based on a certain reasoned faith in them. It also means subordination of reason to intuition. Thus the authority of the Vedas is nothing but the authority of intuition. Intuition is regarded as supra-intellectual direct knowledge. It transcends sense-experience. The six systems of Indian philosophy do not think that the human experience understood in its empirical sense can exhaust Reality. It is clearly understood that the authority of revelation is to be invoked for "new and extra-empirical knowledge and not in matters of common knowledge". Every system of Indian philosophy is critical and not dogmatic. It reaches its conclusions independently. It only draws its additional strength from the fact that those conclusions are also supported by the Vedas which are regarded as Apauruseya. An Indian philosopher would never say that "this is true because the Vedas say so". He would rather say "....moreover this is also verified by what is said in the Vedas". Indian philosophy thus does not dogmatically assume the authority of the Vedas. If it were so, it would never have developed different systems like Nyaya and Samkhya or Vaisesika and Vedanta.

All the six systems accept almost the same pramanas, i.e. the means of valid knowledge. These are Perception (Pratyaksha), Inference (Anumana), Testimony (Sabda), and Comparison (Upamana). The word Pramana signifies the essential means of arriving at valid knowledge. The first two are accepted by all. As regards Sabda, it does not mean, the act of hearing a word but accepting a certain proposition coming from a trustworthy person as true. Sabdapramana thus implicitly indicates the authority of intuition which was regarded as embodied in the Vedic texts, the Srutis. In India, however, pramana signifies,—in the words of Hiriyanna—"not tradition in general but systematised tradition". In this there lurks a danger of resorting to dogmatism. Hence the Indian philosophers lay down certain conditions before a reference is made to a revealed text. They are : (1) the revealed truth should be extra-empirical, (2) it should not be contradicted by other pramanas, (3) "The reason should foreshadow what revelation teaches". In the view of the majority of Indian philosophers, reason by itself is incapable of discerning the whole truth. It may often lead to two or more plausible conclusions and without the aid of revelation it is impossible to avoid scepticism. It should, therefore, be observed that Indian philosophy does not dogmatically assume Sabdapramana i.e. the authority of Sruti. However, it must be admitted that despite careful reservations, the Vedas remain an external authority.

All the six systems of Indian philosophy accept the first four pramanas mentioned above. However, the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins, accept in addition, two more, viz. presumption (i.e. Arthapapatti) and non-perception (Anupalabdhi). All the six systems discuss the nature, origin, and conditions of validity of these pramanas as valid means of knowledge.

Finally, "all schools of Indian philosophy demand rigid self-control, severe moral discipline, constant meditation of truths and right faith and devotion as indispensable prerequisites of the vision of truth and consequent liberation". Since the Indian philosophy aspires not after the mediate knowledge but a direct vision of truth, it is intimately connected with ethical discipline. For insight into Reality is possible with an intense moral effort. No philosophical investigation can be completely separated from ethical considerations. And the different systems of Indian philosophy lay different stress on different aspects of ethical life. Hence the dominant motive of all the six systems of Indian philosophy remains ethical.

CHAPTER I

NYAYA DARSHANA OF GAUTAMA (400 B.C.)

Gautama, the author of the Nyaya-Sutras, was the founder of the Nyaya system. The system evolved a realistic theory of knowledge. To the Nyaya thinkers the problem of how to know reality is perhaps far more important than a mere speculation on its nature and number. The Nyaya conception of the universe was realistic and hence the system turned out to be a logical realism. A thorough examination of the nature and limits of knowledge was its primary concern. The system derived its name from the word Nyaya which meant 'argumentation' and indirectly indicated an analytical and logical method. Gautama, though preoccupied with the problems of epistemology evolved an independent metaphysical doctrine. In the hands of the later Nayyayikas the latter aspect was almost relegated to the background. Gangesha was the founder of the modern school of Nyaya. It flourished in Bengal and took great strides in the direction of systematising Indian Logic.

The Nyaya philosophy is based on the study of sixteen philosophical topics. They may be enumerated as follows: (1) Pramana which means the means of valid knowledge; (2) Prameya i.e. the object of right knowledge; (3) Samsaya i.e. doubt; (4) Prayojana i.e.

the end or motive of action; (5) Drshtanta i.e. illustrative example ; (6) Siddhanta i.e. proved conclusion (7) Avayava i.e. the constituent propositions of a syllogism; (8) Tarka i.e. hypothetical reasoning; (9) Nirnaya which means ascertaining of truth; (10) Vada which means debate or discussion; (11) Jalpa i.e. disputation; (12) Vitanda i.e. wrangling; (13) Hetvabhasa i.e. fallacy; (14) Chhala i.e. quibble; (15) Jati i.e. Causuistry and finally (16) Nigrahasthana which means the point of the opponent's defeat.

All these aforesaid sixteen philosophical topics mostly refer to the basic points of a theory of knowledge. For instance, pramanas which are four in number viz. perception, inference analogy and testimony are the four important sources of knowledge. All knowledge implies subject-object relationship. As such the Nayyayikas mention under the head of Prameya, some of the objects of knowledge. For instance, body, sense organs, world of objects, actions, pain, rebirth and release are some of the objects of knowledge. Samsaya represents uncertainty and hence indefinite knowledge. It is not error or false knowledge. Limits of perception are overcome by inference which refer to topics from number five to sixteen. The fourth one prayojana means motive. It is a final cause of action. All action aims at securing pleasure and shunning pain. This becomes an important philosophical topic in view of its bearing on the problem of the highest good which is deliverance from pleasure as well as pain.

Pramanas :

The word pramana signifies the essential means of arriving at valid knowledge. As such it is defined as "Prama-karanam pramanam" Prama means valid knowledge. That which makes valid knowledge possible is therefore called pramanam. The Nyaya theory of reality is based on the theory of knowledge and accordingly, the discussion of pramanas acquires a great importance in the Nyaya system.

The Nayyayikas recognise four distinct sources of valid knowledge. These are: (1) Pratyaksha i.e. perception; (2) Anumana i.e. inference; (3) Upanana i.e. comparison and Sabda i.e. testimony. Each of these pramanas is fully analysed and discussed in the Nyaya system. The inclusion of Sabda as one of the valid sources of knowledge is indeed peculiar to the Indian view.

Perception : Gautama defines perception as, "non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects not associated with a name and determinate." Thus perception is a kind of cognition and is an attribute of the self. It implies mind-soul contact and also mind-sense-organ contact. The latter also implies sense-organ-object intercourse. The definition also implies two kinds of perception : determinate (Savikalpa) and indeterminate (Nirvikalpa). It also

lays down a logical condition for valid knowledge that it should not contradict the real nature of the object. For Pratyaksha should be Avyabhichari. The above description does not apply to the perception of God or to the perception of the yogins which is not produced by the external sense. In these cases perception is direct and immediate knowledge. Nyaya recognizes two kinds of perception: ordinary (Laukika) and extra-ordinary (Alaukika). Perception can be either determinate or indeterminate. According to Jayanta Bhatta, indeterminate perception apprehends generality, substantiality, quality and action, but is devoid of association with a name, while determinate perception apprehends all these characters together with a name.

Inference is another valid source of knowledge Inference is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Hence, inference is indirect and mediate knowledge. Inference is called Anumana because it is a kind of knowledge which we get after other knowledge. The Nyaya system recoginzes two types of Inference: inference for oneself and inference for others: The former is a psychological process, the latter is a logical process. The Nyaya thinkers do not discuss the formal aspect of inference. For them consistency cannot be divorced from correspondence to facts.

Upamana i.e. comparsion is another source of valid knowledge. In comparison we acquire the

knowledge of a new property through its resemblance with another thing previously well known. Upamana reveals two facts: The knowledge of a new object, not perceived before and the knowledge of resemblance between it and a well-known object perceived before. The modern Nayyayikas hold that the perception of similarity is the special cause of the new knowledge. Knowledge by upamana consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and an object denoted by it. Upamana should not be confused with analogy of the Western Logic. For sometimes upamana depends upon the knowledge of contrast.

Sabda: The Nyaya holds Sabda as an independent source of valid knowledge. Sabda, to all intents and purposes remains an external authority. "It is a sentence uttered by a person who knows the truth and communicates it correctly". It also consists "in understanding the meaning of a statement coming from a trustworthy person".

The Nayyayikas recognise two kinds of Sabda. It is testimony relating to perceptible objects and imperceptible objects. What has been said in the scriptures about perceptible objects such as medicines, rainfall, rites, ceremonies etc. are of the first kind. Whereas what the scriptures say about life after death, heaven, God and the like fall under the second category.

The modern Nayyayikas classify Sabda into two kinds: secular (Laukika) testimony and scriptural (Vaidika) testimony. The latter is Apauruseya. As their source is not human, they are infallible. The secular testimony can not be regarded as infallible. Testimony is to be accepted from a trustworthy person. Besides it should not lead to a tendency of leaning towards dagmatism. Hence, the reliability of a person is the first condition. A sentence must consist of words which imply one another. The words in a sentence must have fitness for one another. Without mutual fitness, a sentence will be unintelligible Thirdly, the words should have close proximity with one another. Further, the sentence should be clear and distinct in bringing out the intention of the speaker. The Nyaya holds that the relation of a word to its meaning is settled by convention. These conditions apply to secular testimony. As regards the scriptural testimony it is accepted as infallible. However, even in case of scriptural testimony, the revealed truth should be new or extra-empirical. Secondly what is revealed should not be contradicted. The theme of revelation can not be wholly out of relation to human experience. The content of the revelation must be coherent. It should help only in those places where the reason fails to discern the truth.

Perception :

To the Nayyayikas the question, 'how to know Reality, is perhaps as important as the question,

'what is Reality ?' As such they discuss in all possible details a theory of knowledge. The bulk of our knowledge is acquired through perception and hence it needs to be discussed threadbare. The Nayyayikas do not take perception for granted.

Perception according to the Nayyayikas is a definite and true cognition of objects produced by sense-object contact. In the Nyaya sutra perception is defined as, "a definite cognition which is produced by the sense-object contact and is true and unerring". When my senses come in contact with a mirror it produces in me the perception of a mirror, and I am definite that the said object I see is a mirror. The distinctive features of perception seem to be its directness and immediacy. There is no recollection involved in it. Hence some Indian Logicians choose to define perception as "immediate cognition (saksat-pratiti) which is mostly conditioned by the sense-object contact."

The Nyaya thinkers have classified perception in numerous ways. Perception can be **laukika** i.e. ordinary or **alaukika,** i.e. extraordinary. In the former case there is a sense-object contact. In the latter, the object as such is not present but is conveyed to the senses through an unusual medium. The ordinary perception may be further subdivided into external and internal. All the five sense organs give us external perception. Mind is the central coordinating organ in all kinds of external perception. Mind, which is

internal, perceives such qualities of the soul as desire, pleasure, pain etc. The Nayyayikas regard mind as an internal organ.

There are three kinds of alaukika pratyaksha i.e. extraordinary perception. viz., Perception of a class (Samanyalakshana). Indirect or acquired perception. (Jnanalakshana) and Yogic perception. In the first category we perceive the general properties such as manhood, boyhood etc. The concept of all men is an example of samanyalakshana. In case of Jnanalakshana, the extraordinary intercourse is through association. It brings about indirect or acquired perception. When we see the smoothness of the top of a table from a distance without feeling it in any way, it is a perception through association. The Yogic perception is brought about by constant meditation. A peculiar power is produced in the self by intense meditation. Through that power, the self can perceive the past and future, remote, hidden or subtle objects.

Another classification of perception is into Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa i.e. determinate and indeterminate percention. The indeterminate perception is devoid of association with a name. In determinate perception all the charcteristics in the indeterminate perception are present together with a name. Gangesha difines indeterminate perception as "the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all association of a name, genus and the like". It is not

of the nature of a judgement. In determinate perception there is a subject-object relationship. Broadly speaking we may say that savikalpa pratyaksha indicates perception proper which is "sensation charged with meaning".

The Nyaya holds that recognition is a single unitary process. It is a perception qualified by the past perception. When I say "This is that Sakhdev", it is recognition. Memory is produced by subconscious impressions. Thus recognition is a kind of qualified perception.

Considering these points, it becomes clear that the Nyaya holds that there are three modes of perception. In the first place there is nirvikalpa pratyaksha, i.e. indeterminate perception in which there is a bare awareness, of the mere existence of a thing without any explict recognition and characterization of it. It is a bare awareness of "that" without any knowledge of "what". It is immediate apprehension of something. The second mode is Savikalpa Pratyaksha in which the object is judged as a particular kind of thing. In this, from vague and indistinct presentation I pass to a stage of definite knowledge. I do not only cognize the existence of the object but also explicitly recognise it. Finally there is pratyabhijna i.e. recognition. It is recognition of an object as what was cognised before. This must be the same person I met on the ship. Here there is a definite recollection dependent upon the past

knowledge. This distinction of perception into, nirvikalpa, savikapla and pratyabhijna seems to be the distinctive feature of the Nyaya theory of perception. Their contentions regarding the Yogaja pratyaksha may not, however, appeal to some who are inclined to believe that all knowledge must be verifiable.

Inference :

In the Nyaya sutra inference i.e. Anumana is defined as Anumiti Karanam Anumanam. It is a kind of knowledge which we get after (Anu) other knowledge. Inference is thus indirect or mediate knowledge. Dr. B. N. Seal aptly brings out the nature of inference in his definition of Anumana. "Anumana is the process of ascertaining not by perception or direct observation, but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character".

Thus there is no scope for inference where perception is possible. And inference is based on the knowledge of invariable concomitance, between the sign (Hetu) and the inferable object (Sadhya). Thus inference is based on Vyapti i.e. the statement of invariable concomitance between Sadhya and Hetu. An example of inference will clarify this point. This hill is on fire, for it smokes. **Where there is smoke, there is fire,** as in the cases of culinary hearth. Accordingly, the hill is smoking and therefore, it is on fire. The third proposition in this argument is

Vyapti the statement of invariable concomitance between Sadhya (fire) and Hetu (smoke).

The Nyaya holds that a syllogism should be a combination of both deductive and inductive inferences. The Nyaya approach to inference is not at all formal. Hence to them syllogism which is meant to be a demonstrative argument should combine both the deductive and inductive elements. Thus the Nyaya syllogism which is a typical example of an inference consists of five members. For instance, (1) Ram is mortal (partijna); (2) Because he is a man (Hetu); (3) Wherever there is humanity there is mortality e.g. Ashoka, Vijaya, Shivaji etc. (Vyapti and Udaharan); (4) Ram is also a man (Upanaya) ; (5) Therefore, he is mortal (Nigamana).

Pratijna, the first proposition, is the assertion. The second advances the reason for that assertion. The third gives us the invariable concomitance supported by illustrations. The fourth one is the application of the universal proposition to the present case. And finally, Nigamana is the conclusion that follows from the preceding propositions.

It will thus be observed that Vyapti i.e. the universal concomitance between the middle and major terms is the basis of inference. There are two kinds of Vyapti : (1) Vishamvyapti and (2) Samavyapti.

The former is Vyapti between two terms of unequal extension : fire and smoke. We may infer fire from smoke but not vice versa. In the latter the two terms are coextensive, such as 'nameable' and 'knowable'.

It may be further pointed out that just as inference in Nyaya is a combined deductive inductive reasoning, even so, all inferences consist of categorical propositions only which are at once formally valid and materially true. Hence Nyaya does not classify inference as deductive and inductive, mediate and immediate, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The Nyaya has its own scheme of classification. In the Nyaya, inference is a conclusive proof

Classification of inference :

In the first place, inference, in the Nyaya, is classified as inference for oneself and inference for others. The former is called Svarthanumana and the latter, Pararthanumana. This is a psychological classification. It depends upon the purpose which the inference in question serves. The inference for others must be stated in its fullfledged form since it is demonstrative and must carry the listener through all the details. The Svarthanumana need not be so elaborate.

Gautama further distinguishes inference into three kinds: (1) Purvavat; (2) Sheshavat; (3) Samanyatodrasta. This is a classification based on the

nature of invariable concomitance. **Puravat** is an inference from **cause to effect** e.g. we perceive dense clouds and infer rain. **Sheshavat** is an inference from effect to cause: We see not a single bus or a tram on the road and infer that the transport employees must be on strike. Both these types are based on causal relationship. Samanyatodastha is an inference of an unknown property from its invariable accompaniment on the grounds of uniformity. Horns are perceived in an animal, from which its cloven hoofs are inferred because the two always go together. It may also be said that purvavat is based on previous experience. Sheshavat is inference by elimination. And the third one is an inference of an unperceived object from the middle term which is perceived.

The Nyaya further recognises three more classifications: (1) Kevalanvayi; (2) Kevalvyatireki; (3) Anvayavyatireki. These kinds of inference are based on the different methods of establishing the invariable concomitance. In the first case the middle term and the major term are positively related. In the second, the middle and the major are negatively related. In the third, the middle and the major are both positively and negatively related.

The Nyaya syllogism is essentially different from its Aristotelian counterpart and as such the comparison between the two will be instructive. The comparison may be briefly stated.

Broadly speaking the difference between the two types of syllogism is both structural and essential. Essentially they are different because while the Aristotelian syllogism is primarily formal, the Nyaya syllogism combines the formal and material elements. Structurally they are different since, the Aristotelian syllogism is composed only of three propositions; whereas the Nyaya syllogism consists of five propositions. There are no figures and moods in the Nyaya syllogism.

In the first place, the two syllogisms differ in some essential features. The Nyaya syllogism is an inference for others, while the Aristotelian one is not. This is proved by the fact that in the Nyaya syllogism the Vyapti i.e. the major premise is always accompanied by illustrations, and hence the argument is a combination of both formal and material elements. Secondly the Nyaya syllogism consists of five constituent propositions while the Aristotelian variety contains only three. Thirdly, the first three propositions of the Nyaya syllogism are stated in the order of conclusion first, then the minor premise and then the major premise. This order is reversed in the Aristotelian syllogism. Fourthly, the example which illustrates the major premise is a distinctive feature of the Nyaya syllogism which is totally absent in its Aristotelian counterpart. Fifthly, in the Aristotelian syllogism the major and the minor terms stand apart in the premises. In the Nyaya syllogism their connection through the middle

term is made explicit by bringing the three terms together in the same proposition in the Upanaya. Unlike the Aristotelian syllogism the Nyaya syllogism does not admit of formal fallacies.

Thus the Nyaya syllogism though roughly corresponds with the categorical syllogism of the Western logic, there are these important differences as stated above. We may compare the examples of the two syllogisms :

NYAYA	ARISTOTELIAN
1. The Mountain is on fire.	1. All smoky objects are fiery.
2. For it has smoke.	2. That mountain is smoky.
3. Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g. an oven.	3. Therefore, that mountain is fiery.
4. The mountain has smoke such as is invariably accompanied by fire.	
5. Therefore, the mountain is on fire.	

Comparatively, the Nyaya syllogism is preferable to the Aristotelian one. Its beauty as well as utility lies in its rejection of the verbal view of logic. "It is

by coustesy that syllogism is described as Anumana". It does not ignore the fact that the subject-matter of logic is thought and not the linguistic forms of thought. As pointed out by Croce: "It does not make the verbal distinctions of subject, copula and predicate; it does not admit classes of categorical and hypothetical, of affirmative and negative judgments. All these are extraneous to logic, whose object is constant knowledge considered in itself." The addition of an example to the major premise and bringing together all the three terms, major, minor and middle together in the Upanaya are the distinctive features which make the Nyaya syllogism preferable to the Aristoteian one.

The structure of the Nyaya syllogism may be described as under: It is a five member syllogism e.g.

1. The Mountain is on fire.
2. For it is smoking.
3. Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g. an oven.
4. The mountain has smoke such as is invariably accompanied by fire.
5. Therefore the mountain is on fire.

The five members of syllogism are :

1. Pratijna (statement) consisting of minor term, (paksha) and the major term (Sadhya).

2. Hetu (minor premise) consisting of the minor term and the middle i.e. (Hetu).
3. Vyapti, (major premise) consisting of the major, the middle and examples.
4. Upanaya, (the application) bringing together the major, the minor and the middle term.
5. Nigamana which the restatement of the final conclusion.

The fallacies of Indian logic are all material fallacies. The form of inference does not undergo any change like the four figures of the different types of syllogism in Western logic. Fallacy is described as **Hetvabhasa.** It means, a hetu i.e. reason which appears as, but really is not a valid hetu. Thus all invalid inferences are based on fallacious reasons. The Nyaya recognises five kinds of fallacies :— (1) Savyabhichara, (2) Viruddha, (3) Satpratipaksha, (4) Assiddha, (5) Badhita. The first one is a case of an irregular middle. It leads to the opposite conclusion. It may be a case of too wide or too narrow a middle term. The second is based on the contradictory middle. For example "sound is eternal because it is produced". Here the middle term 'produced' is connected both with eternal and non-eternal. The third one is a case where one middle is contradicted by another middle, e.g. "sound is eternal because it is audible" and "sound is non-eternal because it is produced". The two middles prove opposite conclusions.

The fourth one is a case of inconclusive middle. It is an unproved assumption. The middle term is assumed in the premises e.g. "the sky-lotus is fragrant because it belongs to the class of lotuses". We are assuming in this case that it belongs to the class of lotuses. The last one is a case where the middle term is contradicted by some other source of valid knowledge. For example, honey is bitter because it is a substance. But the bitterness in honey is contradicted by our actual perception of sweetness in honey.

The Nyaya Metaphysics :

Realism is the name given to that system of philosophy which believes that reality is independent of the perceving mind which cognizes it. In other words, reality is not mind-dependent. The Nyaya holds that the external world is real and independent of consciousness or of the self. Existence is not to be equated to the states of consciousness of any self finite or infinite. The fact that reality is known in experience does not make it experiential in character. The world is thus not considered as an "externalisation of spirit"

The Nyaya holds that things in the external world will continue to exist independently of any perceiving mind. Its view of the world is that it is material and is composed of infinite atoms in space and time independent of consciousness. The Nyaya refutes the subjective idealism of the Buddhists. This realistic

conception of the world is based, according to the Nayyayikas, on logical grounds. The nature of reality can be known by arriving at a right sort of theory of knowledge. Hence it elaborately studies the various sources of knowledge. According to the Nyaya, knowledge manifests objects and the nature of the external world. It is known by the self. Even the bondage is removed by the right type of knowledge. Thus the realism of Nyaya is not based on any testimony but on logical grounds which they have established on the basis of a valid theory of knowledge.

It should be observed that in the Nyaya, the realistic view of the world is based "not on mere faith or feeling, intuition or scriptural testimony but on logical grounds and critical reflections". This is the true meaning of the logical realism of the Nyaya-darshana.

Self :

The Nyaya advocates a theory that self is to be regarded as a substance (Dravya). Its characteristics are that it is one in each body, it is eternal, ubiquitous. It possesses the qualities of cognition such as pleasure, pain, desire, volition. It also possesses merit and demerit. Merits and demerits are the result of its activities. Thus the self is regarded as an agent and also one who enjoys.

It is interesting to observe that the Nyaya holds that the self is unconscious in itself. But because it is

associated with the mind whose attribute is consciousness that it also acquires consciousness. Thus consciousness is an accident and not the essence of the self. In the state of liberation as well as dreamless sleep it remains in its unconscious state which is its natural state. During the waking state it is constantly conjoined with the mind and the sense organs.

The Nyaya holds that, the self is the knower, the enjoyer, and an active agent. Knowing, feeling, willing are its qualities. The Nyaya regards the self as partless and eternal. As such it is simple and not compound. It cannot be destroyed. It has neither a beginning nor an end. It assumes a body suitable to its desert. In this case it is subject to the law of Adrishta. The soul accordingly suffers transmigration. Transmigration is a logical consequence that follows from the law of Karma. Each soul has a mind which persists throughout its empirical life (Samsara). It is separated from the mind, only in its state of liberation.

The Nyaya holds that there are many ways in which the existence of self can be proved. In the first instance, it can be proved from desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain. It is the self that gives continuity and identity to our mental life. It is the same self that is in doubt first and certainty afterwards. The qualities of cognition inhere in the self.

Secondly, consciousness is not a property of the body since it is not destroyed with the body. Hence it must reside in the self. The lapse of consciousness during life also points out that it has a residence in the self and not in the body.

Thirdly, consciousness is also not a property of the sense organs. The sense organs are made of material element and hence they cannot be conscious. They in their nature seem to be instruments of an agent. And this agent must be the self. The sense-organs are mutually exclusive and yet they serve the self because it has consciousness.

Fourthly, consciousness is also not a property of the mind. Mind is a synthesising agent. But the mind itself is an instrument of an agent that is self. It is an organ of internal perception. The self can percieve objects in succession because of the atomic nature of the mind. Fifthly, the self is not identical even with the vital force (Prana). It depends on the self and therefore is not identical with it. Sixthly, consciousness cannot be a property of an object because an object is not conscious of its own position. Finally, memory or recollection also points out to the existence of the self and as consciousness is not a property of any of the above things, it is proved that it must be the property of something. And that something must be the self.

The External World :

The Nayyayikas have a rational and scientific conception of the external world. The world has a reality of its own and it exists externally to the self and God. This is a kind of naive realism. Material objects are conceived as consisting of primary and secondary qualities. Substances are real and abiding. The substances exist over and above the qualities.

Cosmology is explained in terms of innumerable atoms. There are atoms of earth, water, fire and air. Ether is one and all pervading. Time and space are considered as objective realities. Time again is one and infinite. All changes occur and have to occur in time. Space like time again is one and infinite. The world of objects exists in space. The world is knowable and known by the self.

God enjoys a unique position in relation to the world. He is the creator of the world. He creates world out of the innumerable atoms which are co-eternal. However, he does not create atoms. He is only an architect who designs the world out of the atomic material that is already existent. The role that God plays in the world is that of an efficient cause. The material cause is atoms. The self and the world are irreducible realities. The Nyaya holds, as pointed out by Jadunath Sinha "theistic atomism". God is external architect to the world. The Nyaya thinkers believe in periodic creation and destruction of the

world. The fashioning out of the world is done in accordance with the law of Adrastha.

The world is governed by the law of Karma. But the law is purposive. The moral causation is the purpose. God plays the role of a harmoniser. He harmonises the mechanical law of the world with the teleological law of moral causation. In short, "he reconciles the realm of nature with the realm of spirits"

Asatkaryavada :

To any system of philosophy, the problem of explaining how things come into being is a tough one. Even to this date the problem of causality has remained a puzzle. The systems of Indian philosophy have tried in their own way to solve this problem of causality and the theory of causation offered by the Nyaya system is known as Asatkaryavada. In simple language asatkaryavada means that the effect is not contained in the cause; and that it is a new emergent.

The Nayyayikas define cause as "an unconditional or necessary, invariable antecedent of an effect". As such, an effect is the unconditional, invariable consequent of a cause. Casual relation is reciprocal. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause, there being no room for plurality of causes.

The cause is directly and immediately connected with the effect. The cause must

always be an antecedent but if it is an unessential antecedent it has no role to play in the production of the effect. It must be a necessary and an invariable antecedent. The fact that the antecedent must be unconditional also implies that it is immediate and not remotely connected with the effect. All these conditions of a cause are to be found in Mill's definition of cause.

An effect is defined as "the counter-entity of its own prior non-existence" (Pragbhava pratiyogi Karyam). Effect may be regarded as a substance, a quality or an action which was non-existent prior to its appearance as an effect. It did not exist, not even in a potential condition — in the cause prior to its production. It is afresh when it appears and as such is entirely a new emergent. This novelty in emergence is indicated by the word Arambha which the Nyaya uses to indicate a new beginning of the effect. The Nyaya holds that in the causal relationship we discover antecedents of two types: necessary and non-essential (Anyathasidha). The former alone constitute cause. The Nayyayikas discredit the activistic or transcendental view of cause. There is no mysterious, or transcendental efficacy or potential power in cause that produces an effect. "It is an expenditure of kinetic energy. For all energy is kinetic and the unconditional antecedence of cause ultimately depends upon the expenditure of energy". The Nyaya view in this respect is quite distinct from the Samkhya and Mimamsa view. The cause is described in the Nyaya

system as (Karanasamagri) a sum total of operative conditions. If there are counter-acting conditions, the cause cannot produce the effect. For instance, we cannot light a matchstick if the matchbox is damp. The dampness in this case is a counter-acting condition. There is thus a close resemblance between the Nyaya conception and the Western conception of cause.

The Nyaya rejects outright the doctrine of plurality of causes. Our experience shows that the same effect is produced by many causes. But it is not true. Those who believe that the same effect may be produced by many causes ignore the distinctive features of the effect. If that is taken into account it will be observed that the same effect (Karyavishesha) will be produced by the same cause (Karanvishesha). Death may be caused by many causes, but death by typhoid will be caused only in typhoid and not by any other cause. If we take cause and effect both in their concrete sense, then the falsity of the plurality of causes is proved.

The Nyaya recognises three kinds of causes: (1) The material (Upadana) or inherent (Samavayi): Clay is the material cause of a jar as wood is that of furniture. The effect inheres in the cause and is inseparable from it. The material cause is always a substance. (2) The non-material or non-inherent cause is the second type of cause. The conjunction of the

threads is the non-inherent (Asamvaya) cause of the cloth. (3) Thirdly, there is an efficient (Nimitta) cause which is the motive power that helps the material cause to produce the effect. The sculptor is the efficient cause of a statue. His chisel and hammer are his accessories. The efficient cause may be a substance, an action or a quality.

Space, time, the knowledge and will of God, merit and demerit and prior non-existence are regarded as common causes of all the effects. The sum and substance of the Nyaya theory of cause is that they regard the effect as a new beginning, non-existent in cause prior to its appearance. However, it is distinct from cause. The cloth does not pre-exist in the threads. It is brought into existence afresh. They stress the sequence view of casuality Cause is continuous with the effect.

Theology:

The place of God is unique in the Nyaya system of philosophy. In the earlier stages of the development of Nyaya its theistic leanings were not so pronounced. Gautama, the founder of the system refers to God in a few aphorisms. However, the later Nayyayikas are out and out theistic in their views and they even elaborately discuss the proofs for the existence of God. The Nayyayikas are wedded to the belief that the individual selves can attain liberation by the grace of God. Consequently, they discuss the

twin problems of the nature of God and the proofs for his existence.

Nature of God : The Nyaya conception of God is that he is "a particular soul endowed with knowledge, pleasure, desire, volition and merit." Vatsyayan regards God as a particular soul (Atmavishesha) endowed with merit, knowledge, intuition and is devoid of demerit, false knowledge and inadvertence. He is in possession of eight supernatural powers. His merit is the result of his volitions. He has a creative will and he is all-knowing and omnipotent. He controls the finite souls, and acts like a benevolent father to them. His knowledge is intuitive; his happiness, eternal. God is compassionate. His merit is eternal and that is responsible for maintaining moral order in the universe. God in the Nyaya seems to be a soul endowed with qualities of personality. He may be described as a sort of supreme person.

Uddyotakara, however, holds that God also possesses an additional attribute of detachment (Vairagya). According to him God has six qualities viz., "eternal knowledge, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction". There is no acquired moral excellence in God. But he does not deny the eternal moral perfection of God. The natural law is subject to the moral law and the moral law follows from his perfection.

Finally, God is the efficient cause of the world. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the

world. In this role he appears as the moral Governor. It is he who shapes the destiny of the souls by rewarding the virtuous and punishing the vicious. He is the creator of the Vedas.

Proofs for the existence of God: The conception of God is so vital to the Nyaya system that there is an attempt made to prove his existence. The proofs may be classified into five heads: (1) The causal or Cosmologico-teleological argument, (2) the moral argument, (3) the testimony of the Vedas, (4) the argument from language and arts, (5) the argument from number. These may be briefly explained as follows:

The world is in the nature of an effect, and thus it logically requires an efficient cause. And God is that efficient cause of the world. The atoms are the material out of which God fashions this world. The production of the world as an effect needs an intelligent cause and that is God. He has the necessary congnition of atoms. He has the desire. Cognition gives rise to desire; desire generates volition and volition produces the necessary motion. He combines atoms in various proportions to form the world of objects. In this sense God is the creator of motion in atoms and the cause of their combination. He voluntarily starts motion in the unintelligent atoms. He is also the cause of the physical and geographical arrangement in the world. The order and placement of things and objects in

the universe is not accidental but purposeful. It is entirely due to the intelligent designing on the part of God. Even plants which appear to be self-growing are produced by God. Thus the Nyaya combines the casual with teleological argument. God not only creates the world but also sustains and destroys it. Every product that is created is subject to destruction. The world down to the dyads is destroyed by action due to the will of God.

The world is fashioned out of atoms for the experience of the individual souls. They acquire merit and demerit by their actions good or bad. There must be someone to guide the operations of the law of Karma. And that moral Governor is God. The external objects are unconscious. They cannot adapt themselves to the merits and demerits. It is the God that guides them and makes them adapt to the merit and demerit of the finite souls. The world is a sphere of moral activity and hence needs a moral superintendent which is God. This resembles the moral argument for the existence of God proffered by Kant.

Thirdly, the Nyaya holds that the Vedas which are Apaurusheya uphold the belief in the existence of God. The Vedas describe him as "the supreme Person, the Lord of all, the Controller of all, the Ruler of all, the Refuge of all". The Vedas are authoritative and their testimony is sufficient proof for the existence of God.

These three may be considered as the major arguments while the remaining two may be regarded as minor ones.

The fourth one suggests that language and arts originated in God. For an artist is moved by the highest ideal of beauty and perfection and these are materialised in God. For God is the symbol of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Similarly God is "the creator of language". "He is the denotative power of words". He is also the cause of convention (Sanketa).

Finally, dyads, triads, and the like have magnitude, because they are substances, and all substances have magnitude. The atomic magnitude and the large magnitude are contraries of each other and as such cannot produce each other. The magnitude of dyad is caused by the number of atoms. Thus the magnitude of a dyad depends upon the duality of the constituent atoms which compose it. And this duality depends on the intellect of God who alone is omniscient and conscious of the atoms. In short as pointed out by Sinha, "Thus God not only produces motion (Kriya) in the atoms by will, bring them together and produces dyads, triads and the like, but also thinks of the numbers, duality and the like which bring about their magnitudes".

Liberation :

Liberation is one of the conceptions which is common to all the six systems and yet it varies

from system to system. Broadly speaking, the Nyaya system may be regarded as holding a negative conception. Gautama defines liberation negatively as the absolute freedom from pain. At the time of dissolution all the finite souls seem to be enjoying this freedom from pain. But that state is not liberation because they have not exhausted their merit or demerit. Liberation (Apavarga) is the absolute freedom from pain. It implies complete annihilation of the special qualities of the soul such as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion etc. On the attainment of liberation the souls cannot come back to body which is the prison-house of the soul. The special qualities are only accidental qualities of the soul and, therefore, liberation consists in return of the soul to its original nature. It is significant to observe that for the Nayyayikas, the essence of liberation lies not in any happiness but in cessation of pain.

Hiriyanna correctly describes the Nyaya conception of liberation when he writes, "For instance in deep sleep, the self remains without pleasure or pain, which may be taken to indicate the possibility of moksha being a similar but permanent condition. Accordingly, the self then not merely transcends empirical life, but also ceases to be the subject of experience in all its forms."

Means of attaining liberation :. The Nyaya has a rational approach to the attainment of liberation. They are emphatic in maintaining that true knowledge

alone can bring about liberation. For the destruction of attachment which is the source of rebirths can be brought about by true knowlege of the soul. This can be done by listening to scriptures (Shravana), meditation (Manana), and firm conviction (Ndidhyasa). The eight-fold path of Yoga is also recommended. However, the realization of true knowledge alone is not sufficient. It must destroy the merit and demerit.

CHAPTER II.

THE VAISESIKA DARSHANA OF KANADA

(300 B.C.)

Kanada, the author of the Vaisesika-Sutra, was the founder of the Vaisesika school of thought. The system derived its name from the word 'Visesa' which name indicates the category of particularity, which is elaborately discussed by the sage Kanada. The Nyaya and the Vaisesika are closely allied systems. The Vaisesika school is known for its scientific approach to the problem of reality and its knowledge. The Vaisesika thinkers developed the atomic theory of the world, though their atomism was neither material nor mechanical in nature. It combines the atomic conception of the world with a realistic concept of the soul and the apparently deistic concept of God. It gives special attention to the classification of realities and the atomic cosmology. The scientific attitude of the Vaisesika thinkers is reflected in their refusal to make God the creator of atoms. They also emphasised the distinction between positive and negative facts and regarded negation as an independent category both objective and real. The Vaisesika system is metaphysically a pluralistic and a realistic system. It emphasises the plurality of the world of objects and their ultimate constituents which are atoms (Paramanu) together with the plurality of indi-

vidual souls. The Vaisesika has considered these points from the scientific standpoint and as such the discussion of the doctrine of categories assumes an important role in the Vaisesika system of philosophy.

The Categories:

The system begins with the postulate that all knowledge points out to an object beyond it and which is independent of it. These objects are also independent of one another and hence the system is a pluralistic realism. But how do we know the nature of these innumerable objects? Herein comes their doctrine of categories.

Padartha, i.e. the category, literally means the "meaning of the word". Every object has a name and description. And as such padartha is an object of knowledge and for that, valid knowledge. The Vaisesika brings all objects of valid knowledge under six categories: They are: (1) Dravya (Substance), (2) Guna (quality), (3) Karma (action), (4) Samanya (generality), (5) Visesa (particularity), (6) Samavaya (inherence) and (7) Abhava (non-existence). It may be noted that Kanada, the founder of the system, did not mention the last category, viz., non-existence. It was added on at a later stage. Shridhar later on explains this by saying that "Non-existence has not been separately mentioned because it depends upon existence, not because it does not exist".

There is, however, an important difference between the sixteen padarthas of the Nyaya system and

the seven categories of the Vaisesika system. In the former case they are divisions of a treatise on logic. For Vaisesika, they are ontological categories. The nature of pluralistic reality is analysed in terms of these seven categories. The first six categories share in common the characteristics of existence, nameability and knowability. Existence implies the presence of intrinsic nature. The three categories of substance, quality and action are related to the nature of being as such. Beinghood subsists in them. Generality, particularity and inherence are related to themselves. They are self-subsistent and known by the intellect. Even these are treated not as logical but ontological categories. Generality and particularity are concepts, relative to intellect. Kanada is definite about it. Later Vaisesikas regarded them as objective existences. Substance, quality and action inhere in beinghood. They produce effects that are subject to destruction. But generality, particularity and inherence are timeless self-sufficient existences.

The Vaisesika categories are inter-related to one another. All things are existent or non-existent. Existence is of properties or of substances. Properties reside in a substance. When they reside in many substances together they become Samanya. Properties that reside in substance are either permanent or transient. The former are called guna the latter karma. Inherence i.e. inseparable relation, and particularity are separate categories. Inherence is one

and eternal. Particularity is the ultimate individuality of an eternal substance.

The Vaisesika regards categories as ontological existences. They are terms into which reality is analysed and analysable. A category thus becomes an object of valid knowledge. Originally, Kanada, the founder of the Vaisesika school, mentioned only six categories and did not include the last one Abhava. These categories may be brieflv discussed as follows :

Dravya (Substance) : Substance is treated as "the intimate cause of an aggregate effect". It is in substance that qualities reside and action takes place. Hence substance in the Vaisesika, does not resemble our conception of gross matter. It includes what we regard as "aerial, imponderable, abstract, spiritual and emotional". Substance is described in nine-fold ways, such as, earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul (atman) and mind (manasa). With these nine species of substance the following qualities unite : Colour, savour, odour, feeling, number, dimension, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posterity, gravity, flidity, sound, understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, effort, merit, demerit and self-restitution. The Vaisesika holds that there is not only one substance but there are many. And a substance is neither a bundle of qualities nor a mere idea. Substances are independent, real, objective substrata of qualities and actions. Qualities and actions inhere in substances. A substance is a material cause of a

product, and has a genus which inheres in it. Substances are eternal and non-eternal, simple and composite. Eternal substances are self-existent. In short, in their conception of substance, the Vaisesikas do not advocate materialism. On the contrary they support a kind of spiritual pluralism.

Guna : Guna means a quality or an attribute. Gunas pertain to one or more dravyas. Thus they are dependent upon substance and yet they are distinct from it. Unlike substance, a quality is not a constituent cause of anything. All qualities must belong to some substance and there cannot be a quality of qualities. According to the Vaisesikas there are in all twenty-four qualities. These are : colour, taste, smell, touch, sound, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, nearness, remoteness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, prayatna, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, tendency, merit and demerit. The gunas are the simplest passive qualities of a substance. And in reducing qualities to the number of twenty-four they have taken them as rudiments to which innumerable qualities are reduced.

Action : It represents physical movement. Though both quality and action inhere in substance, the quality is passive, but the action is dynamic. Thus action is an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction. An action is transitory, while quality is permanent. Kanada defines action as that which inheres in substances and is the direct cause of conjunction

and disjunction. All actions subsist in limited substances (Murtadravya). The Vaisesikas conceive five kinds of action ; (1) Throwing upward (Utkshepana), (2) Throwing downward (Avakshepana), (3) Contraction (Akunchana), (4) Expansion (Prasarana) and (5) Locomotion (Gamana). A ball can be thrown up; it comes down, moves along the ground. In cold, substances contract, in heat, they expand. Finally, all kinds of action cannot be perceived. The actions in imperceptible substance such as mind cannot be perceived. Mind is imperceptible on account of its atomic nature.

Generality : For Kanada, generality and particularity are mental concepts because they are dependent upon intellect. Generality is a means by which intellect assimilates a number of objects and forms a class. But according to him this common quality i.e. generality exists in things. However, he may be regarded as a conceptualist because he advocates that the concepts are entities subsisting in mind. But the later Vaisesikas advocate realism and believe that the concepts are the real objective entities. Samanya is the one in many i.e. the universal. It is thus a class-essence. It is e.g. 'cowness' in cows, or 'catiness' in cats. The universal subsists in substances, qualities and actions. The universal does not subsist in another universal. The universal exists in each individual wholly. It is related to the individual by inherece. There are three kinds of universals : para; apara and parapara, i.e. the highest and all pervading such as

summum genus; the lowest and the intermediate i.e. the proximate and subaltern genera. Being is para i.e. the highest; Living or animate may be parapara i.e. intermediate and cow may be regarded as Apara i.e. the lowest.

Visesa : Particularity is the one category from which the system derived the name Vaisesika. It may be regarded as "atomic individualities or ultimate differences". In the form of Visesa, the substance is eternal, but transient. Visesa is the opposite of generality. It is the basis of eternal discrimination of eternal individuals from one another. Thus space is one eternal substance. It has particularity which distinguishes it from another eternal substance, e.g. time. Particularity inheres in eternal substances only. It is the ultimate (Antya) peculiarity. Particularity does not require another particularity to distinguish it from other particularities. Composite substances, for instance, compounds such as jars, chairs, etc. are distinguished from one another by the differences of their parts. The atoms which are partless and eternal have also their particularities. Without them atoms would be indistinguishable from one another. And so there are inuumerable particularities inhering in them. This is their case for pluralistic realism.

Samavaya : Kanada defines inherence as "the relation between the material cause and its effect through which one abides in the other". He made it a category for causal relations. Later on even non-

causal relations were brought under it. When two things are inseparably connected that relation was indicated by that word inherence. Inherence is one only and it exists in those things which cannot be separated. It is eternal. Thus the whole inheres in parts, substances in qualities and actions, generality in individuals; particularity in eternal substances. Inherence is one eternal relation. The whole cannot exist without part, but the parts can. The genus "man" inheres in an individual person. Particularities subsist in eternal substances only. Inherence is an intimate relationship between inseparable things. There are many generalities, many particularities but inherence is only one. Unlike conjunction it is eternal. Dr. Radhakrishnan regards inherence as an internal relationship. He says, "Inherence is real coherence". Conjunction joins two things together without forming a real whole. Jadunath Sinha is of the opinion that inherence should not be regarded as internal relation. There is no mutual dependence and hence it should not be regarded as internal. Hiriyanna, however, thinks that inherence is an external relation. It is external not in the sense that both its terms are equally independent as in samyoga, but only one is so.

Abhava (Negation): This category has been a later addition and is a result of carrying realistic philosophy to its logical conclusion. It corresponds to reality presented in the predicate of a negative judgment. As Hiriyanna puts it, "absence of an object is not the same thing as the knowledge of its absence".

However, Abhava implies negation of something and not absolute nothing (Sunya). The Vaisesikas recognise four varieties of negation or non-existence. (1) Pragbhava i.e prior non-existence; (2) Dhvamsabhava i.e. posterior negation; (3) Anyonyabhava i.e. mutual non-existence and (4) Atyantabhava i.e. absolute non-existence.

The first is the non-existence of an object before production. This negation is beginningless but comes to an end when a thing is produced. A new glass jug is produced. Before it was produced it was non-existent. Secondly, when we break a glass jug it becomes subsequent negation since there is no jug existing and since the identical jug cannot appear again, this type of non-existence has a beginning but no end. The third one is mutual negation. It is non-existence of one as another. A jug is not a chair. It expresses mutual exclusion. The last one is absolute non-existence. It indicates non-existence in the past, present and future, e.g. colour never existed, nor does exist, nor will exist in air. Absolute non-existence is without a beginning or an end. The denial of non-existence would amount to accepting that all things are eternal. Without prior non-existence all things would be beginningless and without posterior non-existence all things would be endless. Without mutual non-existence things would be indistinguishable. And finally without absolute non-existence all things would be existing always and

everywhere. The recognition of Abhava as an independent category is the unique feature of the Vaisesika system and they find it necessary to explain existence.

In the Western philosophy, Aristotle gave a good deal of attention to the doctrine of categories. As such a comparison between the two doctrines would be instructive. It may be observed at the very outset that the two philosophers differ both in their approach to the problem of categories and the details in which they work it out.

As regards the details, the Vaisesikas mention seven categories as detailed above. On the other hand, Aristotle recognises ten categories. They are: Substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, posture, property, activity and passivity. Of these ten, the last nine or predicable of a substance, whereas a substance cannot be predicated of anything. On analysis we find that Aristotle's categories are different types of predicables. Kanada's categories may be brought under those of Aristotle. Both recognise substance, and quality. Aristotle's quantity comes under Kanada's quality. Aristotle regards relation as of two types: conjunction and inherence. To Kanada inherence is a separate category but conjunction is a mere quality. Activity is recognised by both but Kanada does not recognise passivity. It is a mere negation of activity. Time and space, are substances according to Kanada. It is not so in Aristotle.

Aristotle's property includes both generality and particularity of Kanada. Aristotle mentions posture as a separate category; for Kanada it is merely a form of quality. Finally, since Aristotle is dealing with positive being he does not recognise separately the category of non-existence which the Vaisesikas do.

Apart from these differences in details the two philosophers differ also in their approach to this problem. Kanada's approach is metaphysical, that of Aristotle is logical. For Aristotle's categories are mainly predicables or classes of terms which can be used as predicates. Kanada includes in his list the terms which can not only be predicates but subjects as well. For him they are different kinds of objects of knowledge. They stand for different kind of things. But Aristotle is concerned only with propositions. Again Aristotle approaches this problem from the point of view of positive being. The Vaisesikas recognise the possibility of a negative being also. Hence the separate category of Abhava. These are the most important points of contrast between the Vaisesika list and the Aristotlian list of categories.

The Vaisesika Atomism:

The Vaisesika system of philosophy adopts a rational approach to the problems of reality. Their approach to this problem is conditioned by their pluralistic conception of reality. Reality according to them is not one but many. That is the inevitable

conclusion to which both logic and experience lead us. However, the manifold reality which is composed of infinite eternal substances is not always perceptible. This brings them to the conception of Paramanu (atom) as the ultimate, imperceptible independent eternal substance constituting reality.

Thus the Vaisesikas advocate the theory of atomism. All things in this universe are composite products divisible into minute parts until we reach the indivisible atoms. An atom marks the limit of division. The atoms are conceived as eternal having the minutest magnitude. They are imagined to be "globular having no parts". They do not interpenetrate but they do combine with one another to form and produce larger magnitudes. Their combination takes place through the medium of ether. Atoms have neither a beginning nor an end. They are not created by God. They are co-eternal with him. These atoms constitute the material cause of the world since, the God creates this world out of these infinite and eternal atoms by arranging their combinations and setting motion in them. The atoms are inactive and motionless. During the period when this world remains dissolved, the atoms remain in their original static and motionless state.

Broadly speaking there are four kinds of atoms: Atoms of earth, water, light and air. There are no atoms of ether. These atoms are attuned to their res-

pective qualities primary as well as secondary. Atoms which are spherical can be described as the minutest spheres. They have no parts but they are spatial. Because they are devoid of parts they have "no within and without". An atom because of its minutest magnitude is described as paramanu (param plus anu). The combination of atoms in twoes and threes produces dyads and triads. Even the dyads are not perceptible. Only a triad is perceptible. Atoms ordinarily imperceptible are, however, supersensible i.e. they can be perceived by God and the seers. This is the theory of atomism according to the Vaisesikas.

It is also a part of their atomic theory that they offer proofs for the existence of atoms. Firstly, they argue that as ether which is one of the highest limit of magnitude, the eternal substances which exist in and through ether demand the lowest limit of subdivision and thus we arrive at the conception of paramanu (atom). Secondly, composite products come into being and are destroyed. They are changeable and divisible, therefore, their constituents must be permanent and indivisible and these constituents are atoms.

The concept of an atom as we ordinarily understand it is materialistic in nature, and, therefore, a very pertinent question arises as to whether the Vaisesika theory of atomism is also materialistic. On analysing the concept of atom in the Vaisesika

philosophy we are driven to the conclusion that far from being materialistic, it has a spiritualistic basis.

This conclusion can be supported on two grounds. It has been expressly stated that the order of the world is on the whole a moral order. This world is created out of atoms in accordance with the merit and demerit as flowing from Adrshta, the law of Karma — and their combination is meant for the experience of individual souls. Because of this we cannot brand the Vaisesika atomism as materialistic. The idea of the dispensation of divine justice at the bottom of creation rules out materialistic conception of the Vaisesika atomism. However, their description of an atom as passive, unconscious, motionless etc. creates a doubt in the mind as to the nature of an atom. How can a spiritual atom have these characteristics ? But it cannot be ignored that five of the nine kinds of substances, to which all things may be reduced are not and cannot be reduced to material atoms. Besides, explicit references to God, individual souls, the existence of intelligent principles guiding the movement of atoms rule out the possibility of a materialistic conception of atoms. It is more in conformity with the general tenor of the Vaisesika system to treat the concept of atom as having a spiritual basis. Hence the Vaisesika atomism seems not to be materialistic but spiritualistic.

It is interesting to observe that in the early Greek philosophy Democritus and Leucippus developed a

theory of atomism as a theory of reality. Sometimes, it is said that the Indians borrowed their theory of atomism from the Greeks when India came in contact with Greece. This insinuation of borrowing is yet to be established. The two systems are miles apart from each other and a comparison between them may be instructive.

Perhaps the only common feature of both the systems is that they believe that the world is composed of infinite number of indivisible atoms. However, the difference in their concept of atoms is pronounced. Firstly, to the Greeks atoms have no qualities but they are only quantities. As such the Greeks do not accept qualitative distinctions in atoms. For Kanada the atoms of water have qualities of odour, colour, taste and temperature; the atoms of light have only colour and temperature. The atoms of air have the quality of temperature. In holding this view Kanada differed from the Greeks.

Secondly, the Greek thinkers endowed atoms with motion. Motion is in the very nature of atoms. For Kanada the atoms are inactive and motionless. Kanada holds that Adrshta produces motion in atoms. Thirdly, whereas for the Greeks the law of the atoms is thoroughly mechanistic, that law according to the Vaiśesikas is teleological. The atoms are not ruled by mechanics alone as the Greeks thought them to be, but they are subject to the moral order. Fourthly, the Greek

atomism is materialistic, while the Vaisesika atomism is spiritualistic in its basis. Fifthly, Democritus held that even souls are composed of atoms, whereas Kanada distinguishes between the souls and atoms. The combination of atoms is, in the eyes of Greeks, according to mechanical laws; while according to the Vaisesika thinkers it is dictated by the Law of Karma. The later Vaisesikas considered God as the efficient cause who arranges atoms. Sixthly, the Greek atomism appears to be atheistic, the Vaisesika counterpart is theistic. The Greeks believed in "the mechanical structure of the universe, while the Indians believed in the teleological constitution of the universe". Thus there is a wide divergence in the outlook between the Greek and the Vaisesika atomism. In the words of Datta and Chatterji, "The atomism of Vaisesika is a phase of their spiritual philosophy". This is totally absent in the theory of early Greek atomism.

The Vaisesika Cosmology:

It is a belief of the Vaisesika thinkers that the world consisting of physical things and living beings is a moral stage for "the education and emancipation" of the individual souls. In this they are influenced by the general spiritual outlook of Indian philosophy.

In explaining how this world came into being, they reduce all composite existing objects to the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, fire and air, and the

composition and decomposition of these atoms takes place in accordance with the Law of Karma. The atoms combine in the form of dyads, triads and other larger compounds arising out of these. The starting-point of the process of creation or destruction is the will of the Supreme Lord. When he wills that individual souls should have their proper share of pleasure and suffering in consequence to their merit and demerit, he starts the process of creation. The process of creation is beginningless (Anadi) and hence we cannot speak of the first creation. Out of the atoms of air their arise mahabhuta of air. It vibrates in the medium of Akasha and in the same way the other three elements water, fire and earth are produced. After the production of these elements there appears through the mere thought of God the embryo of the world. God animates it with the world soul, Brahma, endowed with wisdom, detachment and excellence. To Brahma God entrusts the work of further creation. The details are worked out according to the Adrshta.

The created world cannot continue endlessly. The creator wants the living beings to have a temporary rest from the incessant sufferings. This is achieved by Him through the process of destruction. The period of creation is followed by a state of destruction. Atoms cannot be destroyed. They lay in an inactive and motionless state. The water dries up, the light is blown out. In this way there is a destruction of elements. What remains are the God and the

atoms and the souls. Atoms remain in isolation. This continues till God wills another creation. In the process of destruction the earth compounds are destroyed first. In the process of creation, the air compounds appear first. This is the Vaisesika account of creation and destruction.

As regards their pluralistic metaphysics we notice these tendencies in the Vaisesika philosophy when we examine their concepts of atoms, souls, minds, space, time, atoms of earth, water, air and light. In these they advocate pluralistic realism. These entities do not depend on the cognising mind for their existence. This is realism. And their distinctness is their essence. This is pluralism. They belive in eternal substances each having its own individuality. Their pluralism culminates in their recognition of particularity as a separate category.

CHAPTER III

THE SAMKKYA DARSHANA OF KAPILA
(Before 200 A.D.)

The Samkhya system was founded by the sage Kapila. The origin of Samkhya system is traced to his Samkhya-Sutra. He wrote another elaborate commentary called the Samkhya-Pravachana-Sutra to amplify his thesis. It is held by some scholars that the Samkhya is one of the oldest schools of Indian thought, since its reference is to be found in Sruti—Smruti—Purana and many other literary works of ancient India. The commentaries on the Samkhya written by Asuri and Panchashika cannot be traced. The earliest authoritative commentary we have is the Samkhya-karika of Ishvar Krishna. Metaphysically, the Samkhya is a dualistic realism, in so far as it postulates matter and spirit as the two ultimate realities independent of each other. However, there is also a streak of pluralism in the Samkhya since it admits the existence of many spirits. One of the distinctive features of the Samkhya is its refusal to accept God as a necessary metaphysical principle. The Samkhya has evolved an elaborate theory of evolution to explain the fact of change in the universe. Hence the doctrine of causation assumes a good deal of significance in the system.

The Sankhya derives its name from the word 'Samkhya' meaning number. This is based on

the interpretation that the Samkhya thinkers maintain that the number of ultimate reality is two — prakrti i.e. matter and purusa i.e. spirit. It also refers to the three gunas : Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The word samkhya may thus mean the emphasis on the quantitative aspect of the metaphysical reality There is yet another interpretation. 'Samkhya' means perfect knowledge. It consists in knowing the true nature of purusa i.e. its distinctness from prakrti and such true knowledge brings about the release (Liberation) of the Purusa from his bondage. There is no evidence for the suggestion that it is so called after the name of its founder Samkha. Samkhya also means a rope. The three gunas of Prakrti are the strands of a rope that bind the Purusa. The second interpretation seems more plausible.

Trigunas : Sattva, Raja and Tama: The Samkhya aims at explaining the fact of change which is so evident in our experience. Their explanation of change is founded upon certain assumptions. These important assumptions are that all change implies something that changes and secondly, the effect is essentially the same as its material cause. They conclude that Prakrti — the primordial matter is the stuff that changes and the continuity in change is maintained by the continuation of the three gunas of Prakrti in varying combinations to be found among the world of objects.

As Hiriyana points out, "Gunas form the substratum of change. The three gunas persist while only their modifications appear and disappear". When all modes of Prakrti are latent we have a state of dissolution. At other times the process of evolution (sarga) is on. Prakrti is constituted of three gunas : Sattva, rajas and tamas. Though they are called Gunas they are not qualities of a substance. They are the ultimate elements in the constitution of Prakrti. They are called gunas because they are subordinate to purusas and are subservient to their ends, or because they are three different strands forming one rope of Prakrti. They are substances because they can be conjoined and disjoined. The three gunes are imperceptible but are super-sensible. Ordinarily their existence is infered from their modifications. They are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. In relation to the evolution of the world they seem to have a functional existence.

Sattva has the function of manifestation (Prakasha); rajas has the function of activity (Pravritti); tamas has the function of restraint (niyama). Sattva manifests objects to consciousness; rajas makes the objects move and act while tamas serves as inertia, resistance and restraint. In the process they produce pleasure, pain and indifference respectively. Sattva represents knowledge, rajas represents motion while tamas ignorance and inaction. The three gunas are often compared to burning of an oil lamp. It burns when oil, light and wick co-operate with one another.

Similarly, the three gunas act in a co-operative system. Though they are opposite in nature and strife is inherent in them, still in their ceaseless trying to preponderate over the other they do not destroy each other. Sometimes Sattva preponderates, at other times it may be rajas; at other times it may be tamas. But even during the preponderence of one the other two persist. They never exist in exclusion. In the final analysis they co-operate with one another to produce the varied effects. And everything can be explained in terms of the combination of these three gunas. In a state of dissolution they reside in the bosom of prakrti in a state of equilibrium. But when Purusa comes near Prakrti, this equipoise is lost, Rajas the principle of motion stirrs up the Prakrti and in the struggle sattva preponderates and the process of evolution starts. When the Purusa realises its distinctness from the Prakrti they once again collapse into the bosom of Prakrti to reside there in peace and tranquility. These gunas are infinite in extent. They are beyond creation and destruction and they cannot change into one another.

Theory of Evolution:

The Samkhya holds that Prakrti is the substratum of the changing phenomena of the world. In a state of equilibrium where the three gunas are held in equipoise they produce themselves. But when Purusa comes near Prakrti, the gunas begin to produce heterogenous effects and the evolution

starts. The vast bosom of Prakrti begins to unfold itself. In the process of evolution **twenty-four** principles emerge and they form the basis of the manifold world. Purusa is always outside the realm of change but it wrongly identifies itself with Prakrti and its products. The order of evolution is as follows:

1. Prakrti — 2. Mahat (the Great) — 3. Ahamkara (ego) — 4. Manas (mind) — 5-9. Sensory organs — 10-14. Motor-organs — 15-19. Tanmatras (subtle elements) — 20-24. Bhutas (gross elements).

The significance of this scheme may be explained as follows: The scheme of evolution includes in addition to what is physical viz., five subtle elements and five gross elements, certain others like manas, ahamkar which appear to be psychical. At the beginning of the period of evolution sattva predominates. It is the beginning of heterogeneous effects. The first product is mahat (the great). It is the germ plasm of the universe. In its psychological aspect it is buddhi, its function being ascertainment and decision. In its pure condition it is virtue and knowledge but it soon becomes vitiated by the other gunas. Ego is the second product arising out of the mahat. It gives the feeling of 'I' and 'mine'. It is due to ahamkar that the Purusa considers himself, as an agent. Ahamkar may be of three types, satvika, rajasika and tamasika. From the first follows the mind, the five organs of perception, (the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch) and the five organs of action, (hands, feet, mouth, anus

and the sex organ). Mind is the central internal organ which does the function of co-ordination. Buddhi, Ahamkara and Manas are the three internal organs, while the ten organs of knowledge and action are external.

The five subtle elements are the generic essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Being subtle they are imperceptible. From these subtle elements arise the five gross elements viz., akasha (ether), it is produced from sound. From the combination of touch and sound arises vayu (air). Out of colour mixed with touch and sound arises teja (light or fire). From taste combined with sound, touch and colour proceeds Apa (water). And from the essence of smell combined with the first four follows Prthvi (earth). Thus the whole course of evolution from Prakrti to five gross elements takes place in two stages: psychical and physical.

The distinctive features of the Samkhya evolution deserve mention. Firstly, it is based on a belief in "the indestructibility of matter and persistence of force". Creation is only the manifestation of what is already in a latent form. Similarly, destruction means change of form—a return of the three gunas to equilibrium. Secondly, evolution is considered as "cyclic or periodical". Periods of evolution are followed by states of dissolution. Hence, change is not a continuous progress in one direction only. Thirdly, evolution is regarded as teleological i.e. purposive. Prakrti is

evolving for the sake of liberation of Purusa. However, Prakrti being non-sentiment, the evolution becomes quasi-teleological. The purpose served by Prakrti is not consciously pursued. Finally, evolution as a teleological process has a reference to the individual and not to the species. It aims at cutting asunder the ties of Purusa so as to bring about its liberation.

In the West the theories of evolution are associated with the names of Darwin Spencer, Bergson and Morgan. But all these theories are vastly different from the Samkya theory. None of them seems to have the same spiritual bias and purpose of the Samkhya theory. The Darwinian theory is out and out materialistic and deals with the development of species. On the other hand the Samkhya theory is teleological and deals with the individual instead of the species. There is no common ground between Morgan's emergent evolution and the Samkhya theory since the Samkhya emphatically denies novelty in the effect. Even the creative evolution of Bergson cannot be regarded as dealing with the individual nor can it be said to have any purpose of liberation. Finally, in the West evolution is not regarded as cyclic or periodical. They do not imagine any reversal of evolution.

The Samkhya theory of evolution though spectacular in appearance and scientific in outlook, contains some logical difficulties. In the first instance, it is a

little difficult to explain how Purusa and Prakrti co-operate. How, for instance, Prakrti which is described as non-sentiment, can work towards the end of the liberation of Purusa? Secondly, how can Prakrti which is considered as material in nature be the material cause of budhi, Ahamkar and mind which are all non-physical ? These are some of the difficulties of the Samkhya theory of evolution which have not been satisfactorily explained.

The Samkhya theory of evolution of the cosmos out of Prakrti is based upon the theory of causation which is described as Satkaryavada. In simple words Satkaryavada means that the effect pre-exists in its cause in a potential condition. For if it did not exist that way it would be difficult to explain why oil should flow only when the oil-seeds are pressed. We cannot substitute particles of sand in the place of oil-seeds and get the desired effect. According to Satkaryavada the effect has no new beginning nor is it altogether a new creation. The effect is the manifestation of something that is already contained in the cause.

The Samkhya offers the following arguments to prove the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. (1) If the effect is not existent in the cause prior to its operation none can bring it into existence out of the cause. Blue cannot be turned into yellow even by thousand artists. The effect is always related to the cause and if it is absolutely non-existent, it would have

no relation to the cause. (2) A particular effect can be produced out of a particular material cause. Clay can produce a jar. This proves that effects are pre-existent in the cause. No relation can exist between an existent cause and a non-existent effect. (3) If the effect unrelated to cause could be produced, then every effect would arise from every cause. But that is not the case. (4) The effect pre-exists in the cause, since it can be produced by a potent cause only. A potent cause is that which has the potential energy to produce a particular effect. (5) The effect pre-exists in the cause, since it is identical in nature with its cause. Cloth is not different from the threads which constitute it. For the sake of relation of inherence, the cause and the effect must be identical in nature. The Samkhya advocates Parinamavada which is a variety of Satkaryavada. It holds that the effect is a real modification of the cause, and the effect only manifests what is already contained in the cause. They recognise two causes the material cause which undergoes the transformation—that cause is Prakrti and the second one is the efficient cause which brings forth what is latent in the cause — that cause is Purusa. Just as milk transforms itself into curds when it comes in contact with something sour, similarly, Prakrti transforms itself into the manifold world when it comes in contact with Purusa.

The belief in the Satkaryavada plays a very important role in the Samkhya evolution. It unfolds several postulates of the Samkhya evolution. The first

of these is that "whatever is, always is; and whatever is not, never is". Secondly, "change implies something that changes". Thirdly, "the effect is essentially the same as its material cause". Fourthly, "all variety can eventually be traced to three sources, which are interdependent". If these postutes are taken away the entire edifice of evolution falls to the ground. No wonder that the Samkhya thinkers take great pains to prove the theory of Satkaryavada which is their basis of the evolution of Prakrti.

It is evident that the Samkhya system advocates a kind of dualism when it asserts that the ultimate reality is two: Prakrti—matter and Purusa—spirit. The entire universe is a result of an interplay of these two principles. However, like all dualistic systems, even the Samkhya system founders on the problem of inter-relation between Prakrti and Purusa.

The two principles are defined as the exact opposites of each other. For Prakrti is non-sentient but active, whereas Purusa is a sentient but inactive substance. Naturally, the question of how the two principles interact, remains a moot-point. In this connection there arise two questions. How are Prakrti and Purusa related in a co-operative effort? And how is it that Prakrti which is non-sentient works for the liberation of Purusa? To both these questions the Samkhya gives unsatisfactory answers.

The relation between Prakrti and Purusa is the crux of the Samkhya philosophy. In the first place, we

may pose a question. If Purusa as is defined by the Samkhya is inactive, how does he move Prakrti? For Prakrti acts to realize the ends of Purusas. It evolves the world for their experience, and dissolves the world for their liberation. The answer given by the Samkhya philosophers to the above question is that just as a magnet attracts iron by its mere proximity, so do the Purusas move Prakrti by their mere proximity. Just as the magnet is an unmoved mover so also Purusa is the unmoved mover. The second analogy that they offer to interrelate the two opposite principles is that of a lame man and a blind man. The union of Purusa and Prakrti is just like the co-operation of a blind man and a lame man. A lame man can see but cannot walk; the blind man can walk but cannot see. So the one makes good the deficiency of the other. Prakrti is active but unconscious, Purusa is conscious but inactive. Prakrti is compared to a blind man; and Purusa to a lame man. Both these arguments are analogies and hence highly unsatisfactory.

The Samkhya evolution is not mechanical but teleological. However, it turns out to be an unconscious teleology. For though Prakrti is working ceaselessly for the liberation of Purusa it is not at all conscious of its work. Here also the Samkhya system betrays its weakness by resorting to analogies. Even as non-intelligent milk flows for the nourishment of the calf or even as non-intelligent trees bear fruit,

similarly, the non-intelligent Prakrti develops for the liberation of Purusas. When the Purusa realizes its true nature, its distinctness from Prakrti, Prakrti is said to retire like a damsel who retires on knowing that her lover has found out her trick. But can Prakrti know? It is really a hard nut to crack.

These hurdles prove enough that the Samkhya finds it extremely difficult to explain the relation between Prakrti and Purusa satisfactorily since it starts with an uncompromising dualism.

Prakrti:

If we overlook the plurality of Purusas for which they offer proofs, the Samkhya system is dualistic. It maintains that Prakrti and Purusa — matter and spirit are the only two ultimate entities of Reality. As such the concept of Prakrti is an important one.

Prakrti may be described as the first cause of the world and hence it is the primordial matter as the basis of the manifold universe. It is the first cause of everything except the spirit. Prakrti is universal principle which accounts for everything physical in terms of matter and force. Even space and time are aspects if Prakrti. This is an important idea since it does not posit matter as existing in space and time. The nature of Prakrti is derived from the nature of common objects. It is the material cause of all things. The three guns — sattva, rajas and tamas — constitute Prakrti. They are not the qualities of Prakrti, but they are its components. During the stage of dissolution Prakrti is in a state of equipoise. As opposed to Purusa it has opposite qualities. It is active but non-sentient and unconscious. Even the gunas remain sub-ordinate to Purusa and finally bring about its liberation. Prakrti is the material cause of the universe and the substratum of evolution.

The Samkhya offers the following arguments to prove the existence of Prakrti. (1) Individual things of experience depend upon their causes which contain them potentially. Every effect has a cause. Therefore, the ultimate cause of the whole universe must be uncaused and Prakrti is the uncaused cause of the whole universe. (2) Individual things are non-eternal, and transient. They must be dissolved and absorbed in their material causes. Prakrti is the ultimate cause into which the whole world is dissolved. (3) Individual things are limited in magnitude. They are finite. The cause must contain more reality than the effect hence the ultimate cause of the universe must be infinite and all pervasive. It must, therefore, be Prakrti. (4) The individual objects are manifold, conditioned, determined and manifest. So they would require a cause that is not conditioned, nor determined, nor manifest. And all these are characteristics of Prakrti. Hence, it exists. Prakrti is, therefore, called Avyakta (unmanifested). All inorganic, organic and mental products are the modifications of Prakrti.

Purusa :

One of the two ultimate realities described by the Samkhya is Purusa. The twin principles of Prakrti and Purusa are entirely opposite in nature. Unlike Prakrti, Purusa is not composed of any gunas. In certain respects the gunas of Prakrti are subordinate to Purusa. Purusa is described as a discriminating but inactive, conscious but motionless ultimate principle of reality. It is non-productive and not subject to any change or modification. It is beyond all mutations. The feeling of one's own existence is the most natural and indubitable feeling that we all have and that itself is the proof for the existence of Purusa i.e. self.

According to the Samkhya, Purusa is different from the body and the senses, the mind and the intellect. It is not an object but a subject of knowledge. It is pure consciousness as such. Consciousness constitutes its essence. It is a transcendent subject. In it there is neither change nor activity. Through ignorance it confuses itself with the products of Prakrti and thus loses sight of its own nature, and is caught up in the quagmire of sorrows and miseries. Purusa is eternal, pure, conscious and liberated. It is free and distinct from the gunas. Purusa appears as active because of its identification with Buddhi. In its intrinsic nature it is free.

Of the proofs offered to support the existence of self, there are two types : One that seeks to prove its

existence, and the other which proves the plurality of selves. The Samkhya proves its existence in the following manner :

1. All objects in this world exist as a means to an end. They serve some purpose for which they exist. So the natural question would be, "What for are these manifold objects of Prakrti ?" Why is Prakrti evolving at all? These objects are not ends in themselves. They must naturally serve the ends of others ; and these others must be the Purusas.

2. Secondly, all objects, mental as well as material, must be guided by an intelligent agent Prakrti, from which they spring, is itself unintelligent Just as an automobile requires a driver, so the machine of Prakrti needs the driving force of Purusa.

3. Thirdly, all objects in the world generate either pleasure, pain or indifference. These have significance if there is an experiencing agent to experience them. There must be subjects to enjoy pleasure, and suffer pain. Prakrti cannot enjoy because she is unconscious. Therefore, Purusa must exist as an enjoyer.

4. Finally, some spiritual aspirants strive for and attain liberation. Intellect cannot attain liberation; so it needs a subject that can transcend the physical order and obtain release from all suffering and pain. Such a subject can be a Purusa and so Purusa i.e. self exists.

But why should there be many Purusas? In other words what are the proofs for the plurality of Purusas? Their arguments are: Firstly, there are obvious differences in births, deaths, sensory and motor endowments of different individuals. If all bodies had the same self there would not have been these distinctions. Hence there are many selves. Secondly, if there was only one self the activity in one should start activity in all; but that does not happen. Therefore, there must be many selves. Finally, men are different from the gods and the beasts. If there was only one self these distinctions would be meaningless. Hence the Samkhya recognizes the plurality of souls and the spiritual unity of each one of them.

The Samkhya Atheism:

Generally, the Samkhya and the Yoga systems which have a close metaphysical alliance are distinguished on the ground that while the Yoga is theistic, the Samkhya is atheistic. Most often the question is raised as to whether the Samkhya system is really atheistic. The scholars, however, are not unanimous in their answers.

As to the facts of the case, the Samkhya belives in future life However, it does not recognize the existence of God. God is not necessary as a creator of the world. Parkrti and Purusa are the two material and efficient causes respectively. Prakrti evolves into

the mainfold world in accordance with the moral deserts of the souls. Under the circumstances God becomes an unnecessary metaphysical assumption. Naturally the Sankhyakarikas do not mention God

Vachaspati interprets this as rank atheism. The Samkhya makes no secret that God is a gratuitous hypothesis. But Vijnanabhikshu thinks that the Samkhya is not avowedly atheistic. If the Samkhya does not show any real interest in God, it is because God cannot be proved. His contention is that even as the Samkhya does not mention the idea of God, nor does it explicitly disprove the existence of God. The negation of God is a bold assertion which they do not want to put forth. The long and short of his argument would be that mere absence of any reference to God is not the conclusive evidence of the Samkhya atheism. Its atheism may be a deliberate attempt to hinder the knowledge of sinners. "The Samkhya atheism is only for practical purposes". Recently, the students of Indian philosophy have also taken this view to mean that the Samkhya system is not really atheistic. It is true that the classical Samkhya argues against the existence of God on metaphysical grounds. For instance, they argue that for an ever changing world we need an active principle of change and that cannot be God because those are not his attributes. Again God seems to be inconsistent with the distinctive reality and immortality of individual souls. It, therefore, follows from this that the existence of God cannot be proved nor is it necessary to explain the world.

Some of the modern writers on the Samkhya like A. K. Majumdar and others have held that all that the Samkhya means is that God as possessed of creative activity cannot be admitted. Yet that does not amount to the denial of a belief in God as an eternally perfect spirit witnessing the world show. And their further contention is that the Sankhya did not repudiate such belief in God and therefore, it is not atheistic.

CHAPTER IV

THE YOGA DARSHANA OF PATANJALI (400 A.D.)

The Yoga is a distinctive contribution of Patanjali to the Indian thought. The Yoga-Sutra of Patanjali introduces the fundamental tenets of the Yoga system. It was commented upon by Vyasa and later by Vachaspati in the Yoga-bhashya and the Tattva vaisharadi respectively. Metaphysically, Patanjali's yoga is linked with Kapila's Samkhya. The only remarkable change that the former has made in his system is the rehabilitation of God who was banished from the Samkhya metaphysics. The discussion of ethical discipline as a preparation for a spiritual career, looms large in the Yoga system. Its aim and object is to lay down a practical path for liberation. As such, in the Yoga system the practical interests predominate over the theoretical ones. It evolves a spiritual concept of the self and aims at describing the ways and means to make the self realize its own true nature.

The Goal of Yoga: The yoga enjoins the path of action and the path of knowledge for the attainment of complete freedom and isolation of the self. The path of knowledge includes the Yogic practices which are set out as Ashtanga Yoga i.e. the eight-fold path. This is a superior path-way to liberation, while the path of action is meant for the inferior per-

sons. The first path consists of a severe mental discipline and cultivation of right knowledge. This path is suitable for introverts. The immediate aim of practising ashtanga yoya is to control completely the various modifications of mind; and the other aim is to attain Kaivalya, right knowledge, through such control of the modifications of mind. As such, Yoga is defined as "Chittavrtti Nirodh" i.e. control of or arresting the modifications of mind. By constant practice of the eight-fold path one attains Samadhi and in Samadhi one realizes the true nature of one's self which is the highest knowledge and the source of liberation. We may, therefore, conclude that the goal of the Yoga system is to prepare every Yogin morally and spiritually. For it is such preparation by intense practice that leads a spiritual aspirant to his cherished goal.

The various steps prescribed for the attainment of Kaivalya are eight in number : viz., (1) Yama (Restraint) ; (2) Niyama (Culture) ; (3) Asana (Posture); (4) Pranayama (Breath-Control); (5) Pratyahar (Withdrawing of the senses from their objects) ; (6) Dharana (Meditation); (7) Dhyana (Concentration) and (8) Samadhi (Trance or deep absorption). Broadly spealking, the first five of the eight steps are meant for the mental and physical discipline. The immeliate aim of this discipline is the purification and enlightenment of Chitta i.e. mind.

Yama i.e. restraint consists in **ahimsa** i.e. abstention from all kinds of injury to any life. Secondly, yama also includes, **satya** i.e. truthfulness, **asteya** i.e. non-stealing, **bramhachraya** i.e. control of the carnal desires and passions, and **aparigraha** i.e. non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts. All these restraints are aimed at purifying one's moral life. The importance of these habits is that a sound mind can reside only in a sound body, and neither of them can be sound if a man is devoid of restraint. So also a man cannot concentrate on any object if his mind is distracted and dissipated by sins and crimes. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that he should lead a healthy moral life.

Niyama : This also consists in cultivating good habits and improving one's culture. It consists of five steps viz., **Sauca,** i.e. purification of the body by washing and taking pure food; **Santosa** i.e. habit of remaining in contentment; **tapas** i.e. penance which consists in increasing our power of endurance, and observing vows etc.; **Svadhyaya** i.e. the regular habit of reading religious books and scriptures etc. and finallv **Ishvarpranidhana** i.e. meditation of and resignation to God.

Asana : This is a rigorous discipline of the body. This consists in a steady posture of the body. There are different kinds of postures, such as, Padmasana, Sirasasana, Mayurasana etc. This is to be practised under able guidance. It helps, preserving

the vital energy and also purifying and strengthening both body and mind.

Pranayama: This consists in controlling one's own breath. It is practised in three stages: deep inspiration (puruka) retention of breath (kumbhaka) and steady expiration (rechaka). The last one is to be practised in measured duration. These are really respiratory exercises that strengthen the heart and the lungs. It is to be practised under expert guidance because otherwise it would be fatal. The process of respiration on which depends the vital breath makes our mind unsteady every moment when air is blown in and blown out. Thus, if and when the breath is controlled the mind also becomes steady.

Pratyahara: This consists in withdrawing the senses from their respective objects. This discipline aims at restraining the mind from the physical side. The fickleness of mind is closely connected with the capacity of the sense organs to distract. But in pratyahara, the mind is not disturbed by the sights and the sounds coming through the eye or the ear. It requires a resolute will and long practice to gain a mastery over the senses. All these five steps considered so far are external aids and the remaining three are internal aids because they are in one way or the other directly connected with the samadhi yoga.

058296

SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT KALADY

Dharana: This is holding the attention by meditation. This is essentially a mental discipline which consists in holding or fixing the mind on the desired object. This object may be a part of one's own body or any other external object. In the former case one may concentrate on the middle of one's eyebrows in the latter, it may be any external object, such as, an image of God. The ability to keep one's mind fixed on any one object is the test of fitness for entering upon the last two stages.

Dhyana: Dhyana means the even flow of thought about or rather around the object of attention held in Dharana. It may be described as a steadfast contemplation of the object without any break or disturbance. This helps us in gaining clear and distinct insight into the nature of the object. Long practice of it leads to a lively presentation of the object. It has thus a power of revelation.

Samadhi: The last step in the eightfold path is Samadhi. In this stage, the mind is deeply absorbed in the object of contemplation. It loses itself in the object and has no awareness of itself. It is a kind of trance in which the subject and the object become one. The thin line that separates dhyan and samadhi is that in the former the act and the object of thought remain separate and distinct. But in the latter, the act of Samadhi is not separately cognised. This Samadhi is different from Chittavrtti nirodha. The former is a means to attain the latter which is the

end. When all these eight disciplines are practised for a long time they lead to samadhi-yoga which is the goal of the yoga system.

The Yoga is defined as Chittavrtti nirodh meaning the "cessation of mental (Chitta) modifications (vrtti). Yoga does not mean any joining, such as, communion between the individual soul and God or anything like that. It really means disjoining of Purusa and Prakrti. The aim is to make Purusa realize its own nature by making it understand its distinctness from Prakrti. But this is not possible so long as the Purusa identifies itself with the mental modifications which emanate from Prakrti. As such the final aim of Yoga is the arrest and negation of all mental modifications. This aim is realized in Samadhi.

The mind which is constituted of Sattva, rajas and tamas has five levels of its life. These levels depend upon the degrees in which these three gunas are combined and are operative. These five levels are named restless, torpid, distracted, concentrated and restrained. In each of these levels there is some kind of repression of mental modifications. In the first the mind is easily distracted by the objects of sense. In the second level where the mind is under the sway of tamas, the mind tends toward vice and ignorance. In the third stage the mind makes for virtue and knowledge. But this remains a temporary stage. In the fourth level the mind is

purged of impurities by virtue of concentration. In the last stage there is cessation of all mental modifications. As such, the last two levels are conducive to the attainment of Samadhi yoga.

In the samadhi yoga there are two stages. One is called 'Samprajnata' samadhi and the other is called 'Asamprajnata' samadhi. In the first type there is a clear and distinct conssciousness of the object of contemplation. The contemplating mind is put in the form of object itself. In the other variety there is cessation of all mental modifications and as such nothing is thought by the mind. The mind is completely in a state cf tranquility. The first type of Samadhi yoga is attained through four stages: first by concentration on a gross body; then concentrating it on subtle objects like the tanmatras till their nature becomes revealed. In the third stage the Yogin concentrates on still subtler bodies and finally the object of concentration is ego-substance (Asmita). It is concentrating on the true nature of the self. It gives us a glimpse of the knowing self.

Asamprajnata samadhi is the goal of Yoga. It is yoga **par excellence**. This is the final stage in which all modifications of the mind cease. The soul in this state realizes its own true nature as pure consciousness. It is pure consciousness contemplating itself. All the distinctions of object and subject, the knower and the known, even the consciousness of the act of thought are all lost. On the attainment of this Yoga

one attains liberation and release from all suffering and pain. It requires a long and arduous endeavour to maintain oneself steadily in the state of this samadhi and destroy all samskaras. The means to attain this ideal is to parctise the eightfold path prescribed by the Yoga system with due devotion and steadfastness.

The Yoga Psychology :

Even a cursory glance at the Yoga system will be sufficient to impress upon the mind of the reader the contributions of the Yoga system to Indian psychology. The Yoga psychology is intellectualistic. It regards emotions as intellectual disorders. They are afflictions and are due to false knowledge. We can put an end to our afflictions by having a right type of knowledge. When the potenices of affliction are burnt up they cannot produce any effect. Secondly, even in those days, the Yoga seems to have developed a clear conception of the sub-conscious impressions or dispositions (Samskaras). It refers to emotional, cognitive and conative dispositions and predispositions of the past life. These can be known through Samadhi. And these dispositions can be destroyed by right knowledge.

The unique contribution of the Yoga system lies in its anticipation of the doctrine of Psycho-analysis which prescribes the methods of discovering the repressed unconscious complexes and tackling them

rationally. However, the Yoga approaches the problem from the point of view of rationalism. Freud advocates irrationalism. Patanjali is an advocate of asceticism; Freud adopts hedonism. The Yoga psychology is predominantly intellectualistic, the latter is voluntaristic. The Yoga does not regard that all judgments are coloured by uncounscious wishes.

The Yoga believes in the self as a free spirit associated with the gross body and more closely related to a subtle body constituted of the sense, the mind, the ego and the intellect. In ignorance the free self identifies itself with the modifications of mind. The self knows the objects through the modifications of mind, which correspond to the objects known. There are five kinds of mental modifications : true cognition, false cognition, verbal cognition, sleep and memory. In recognizing sleep as a mental modification, the Yoga thinkers became the forerunners of psycho-analysis. They did not regard sleep as an absence of mental modifications. If it were so how can one after getting up from sound dreamless sleep say that "I slept well"? This proves that there is mental modification even during sleep.

Another distinctive feature of the Yoga psychology is its views on the problem of mind and body relationship. They hold that when the Chitta is modified into any cognitive mental state, the self is reflected in it and is apt to appropriate it as a state of itself. It is

interesting to observe that the mind is not conceived as something opposed to the body but is conceived as a subtle body. Hence there is really no problem of how mind and body interact. They emanate from the same Prakrti. Hence there is no unbridgeable gap between the physical and the psychical. The Self is apart from Prakrti. It gets itself in the mental modification through avidya, asmita, raga, dvesa and abhinivesha. In the words of Professor Hiriyanna, "the functions that we describe as mental are really mechanical processes of physical organs which assume a psychical character only when illumined by spirit i.e. Purusa". Psychology is not the science of mind but a science of the soul. The senses are derived not from the gross elements but from Ahamkara. But Ahamkara is itself a product of Prakrti. The Buddhi corresponds to the will-aspect of conscious life.

The Yoga Theology :

The place of God in the Yoga philosophy may be correctly described in the words of Judunath Sinha: "Patanjali grafts the concept of God on the Samkhya metaphysics and makes it theistic". Madvacharya describes Patanjali as the founder of theistic Samkhya. To the Yoga thinkers God is both a practical and theoretical necessity. Patanjali emphasised the practical importance of God. In discussing Niyama he refers to Ishwarpranidhana which is one of the means of Yoga or complete arrest of mental modifications.

It means either devotion to God or resignation of all actions and fruits to him. Patanjali recognized three realities : Prakrti, Purusa and God. But God is not an integral part of his system. The later Yogins, however, are not satisfied with the unconscious teleology of the earlier thinkers and they, therefore, maintain that God is also a metaphysical necessity. It is he who relates Prakrti and Purusa. God consciously realizes the ends of Purusa through the evolution of Prakrti, which he guides from without. Thus God is not only an ideal of moral and spiritual perfection; not only a helpful hand by whose mercy the spiritual aspirant finds his task easier; not only a presiding deity who controls the law of karma and looks after the stock-taking of good and bad, merit and demerit, but also an efficient cause without which Prakrti and Purusa cannot come together, nor can the former evolve and the latter be liberated. Thus for the later Yogins God is not only a practical proposition but also a theoretical necessity in the Yoga metaphysics. The importance of the role that God plays in the Yoga system is realized from the fact that they thought it a necessary to offer the proofs for the existence of God.

Proofs for the existence of God : Patanjali offers an ontological argument for the existence of God. The law of continuity points to his existence. Magnitude admits of degrees, higher and lower. Ether is the highest; an atom is the lowest. So knowledge admits of degrees and God is

the highest limit of knowledge. He is the highest limit of omniscience. Vyasa applies the law of continuity to power and lordship (Aishvarya) of God. He is the highest embodiment of power. Secondly, the existence of God is proved by the testimony of the Vedas. The scriptures are apauruseya. They contain revealed truths and as such they cannot utter any falsehood. The third argument is a causal or cosmologico-teleological argument. The creation of the world is due to the association of Purusa and Prakrti, and the dissolution of the world is due to their dissociation. But their coming together requires an external agency, similarly, the evolution of Prakrti needs an intelligent observer. This function is preformed by that supreme person who is God and, therefore, he exists. Without his guidance Prakrti cannot produce the order in accordance with Adrshta.

Nature of God: Patanjali describes God as a particular self (Purusa visesa) untouched by any afflictions, actions, dispositions and fruits. He is a perfect and free self. He is eternally fulfilled. As such he does not experience any fruits of action. He is not absorbed in Prakrti. He has no afflictions. He is the eternal Lord, omniscient and omnipotent. He is an all pervading supreme Person. He is a perfect immortal spirit eternal, free from all defects and remains untouched by any afflictions, actions and their effects and impressions. Because he has full knowledge about the past, present and future he maintains

the world by his mere wish and thought. He has intuitive knowledge of the whole universe.

Though the Yoga system believes in the supreme God, it also recongizes the existence of many gods who are entangled in the empirical life through ignorance. Such a conception of God is contradictory to the fundamental tenets of the Yoga system. God is not limited by time. He favours the aspirants who are devoted to Him. The relation of God to Prakrti and Purusas is not inseparable and organic. He is not the creator, preserver or destroyer of prakrti which is eternal though mutable. He seems to be loosely connected with the world. Looking to this account of God one may observe that the personal God of the Yoga sutras is not only unnecessary, but also untenable.

All the systems of Indian philosophy accept the eight-fold path laid down by the Yoga thinkers. In this acceptance lies the recognition of the unique contribution that the Yoga has made to Indian philosophy. Even to this date many seekers after truth have turned to Yogic practices to purify their mind and body. The physical and mental discipline prescribed by the Yoga has thus remained a valuable asset to all spiritual aspirants. It has stressed the method of self-help and severe mental discipline.

The Yoga ethics aims at intellectural perfectionism. The Yoga method of self-realization is a

bold achievement of the Hindu mind. The Yoga contribution in the field of psychology, its solution of the mind-body problem and the theory that the mind thinks even during sleep are some of the outstanding contributions of the Yoga system to Indian philosophy.

CHAPTER V

THE MIMAMSA DARSHANA OF JAIMINI (400 B.C.)

Jaimini founded the Mimamsa school of thought. His primary objective was to construct a metaphysical theory which would justify the Vedic injunctions regarding the rituals. The Vedas are accepted as infallible. Naturally the development of a theory of knowledge, compatible with such a belief assumes great significance. The next important topic is the concept of duty. The performance of the Vedic rituals necessitates an elaborate theory of morals clarifying the concepts of duty and moral agent. Jaimini's Sutras laid the foundation of the system. It was developed on two different lines resulting in the establishment of two different schools headed by Kumarlia and Prabhakara. Etymologically, the word Mimamsa means "solution of some problem by critical examination of grounds". Eventually it stood for that system which offers a solution of the problem of Karma by critical examination. Hence it is also called Karma-Mimamsa. Apparently it is polytheistic, but strangely enough the innumerable gods mentioned therein have existence only in the mantras. The Mimamsa argues against the conception of God as the creator of the universe. It is more anxious to uphold the supremacy of the Vedas.

The Mimamsa Ethics :

Of all the six systems, the Mimamsa emphasises the ritualistic aspect of the Vedas. It is obligatory to perform rituals since their due performance is rightly rewarded elsewhere if not here. Such an approach is bound to be based on certain ethical grounds. Hence the Mimamsakas pay much attention to the discussion of ethical problems.

One of the important conceptions in the ethical topics of the Mimamsakas is that of duty. The rituals are considered as a part and parcel of our duty. Hence it needs elaboration. Duty is founded upon voluntary action. Prabhakara analyses voluntary action into four steps : The condition that something is to be done. The condition that it can be done by an effort of will. The self then identifies itself with the act represented by it. There is a desire to do the act; and finally there is the overt action. Prabhakara conceives two types of duties : (1) conditional duties in case of prudential actions for material gain and (2) unconditional duties which again are of two types viz., necessary (Nityakarma) and occasional (Naimittika).

Conditional duties are prudential acts prompted by material gains. The act of self-appropriation is common to both conditional and necessary duties. However, Prabhakara thinks that mere desire for pleasure is not the real motive force. It is the self qualified by the desire for pleasure that is the spring of action. In unconditional duties there is no desire for pleasure. They are free from empirical motives. These duties are founded upon a purely rational will which has no regard for any material gain. Prabhakara emphasises "the element of self-reference" in all voluntary acts. Thus he advocates the doctrine of self-determinism and freedom of will. Every voluntary act implies that it can be done. The volition of self is again determined by its own free will. "The will to accomplish an act is itself determined by the pure will of the self." Prabhakara regards that freedom is self-determinism. As S. K. Maitra observes, "The Prabhakaras urge that this indeterminism is itself a moment in self-determinism. The will to accomplish is freely willed, i.e. it depends on the agent's undetermined freedom. Thus the cognition of duty implies the cognition of the will to will". Prabhakara also gives the moral proof of freedom. He says that the Vedas enjoin "It ought to be done", which means it can be done 'Ought' implies 'can'. The injunctions of the Vedas are categorical imperatives. They are ends in themselves. The highest culminating point in the Mimamsa ethics is their conception of duty (Dharma). Unlike Kant, they do not postulate God as the source of obligation. The Mimamsakas postulate the impersonal universal law of Karma as its source. They would say "do thy duty because the impersonal Vedic authority categorically enjoins you to do it".

The Mimamsa ethics is a kind of perfectionism and it is based on the conception of self-determinism. As it deals with the ritualistic aspect of the Vedas it regards the injunctions of the Vedas as categorical imperatives and naturally the concept of duty acquires a vital importance in the Mimamsa system.

The earlier Mimamsakas regard duty as Apurva or unseen agency generated by the performance of the enjoined actions. Kumarila regards it as the performance of the duties themselves. Prabhakara regrds it as an objective category. It is Imperative. To Prabhakara, duty is not a subjective category. It is not a quality of the self, nor of the intellect. He does not agree with the view that it is an external act enjoined by the Vedas. "A person who performs sacrifices is called virtuous not for any extraneous reason but because he executes the moral law." "Dharma (duty) is conducive to the highest good of the moral agent". To this Prabhakara would reply, "The Moral Imperative (Apurva) is conducive to the highest good and it is indicated by the Vedic injunctions". Thus Dharma is an objective category. Prabhakara further holds that the ceremonial acts are the contents of duty. They fulfil the moral imperative. They do not derive their authoritativeness from any ulterior end, but from their intrinsic validity revealed in the Moral Law. The moral Law is the transcendental variety of the Moral Order. It is not a personal or a divine command. It is self-authoritative. "The moral Imperative

is an accomplished fact. It is a unique relation of a command to the agent commanded. It is a relation of revelation"

Prabhakara recognizes two kinds of duties: the Conditional duties and the unconditional duties. Both of them (Nityakarma and Naimittika) are done out of a sense of duty and involve self-determinism. Morality consists in following the Moral Imperative irrespective of any desires or consequences. Prabhakara resembles more to Kant. However Kant's Categorical Imperative is a subjective law. To Prabhakara, it is an accomplished fact. Prabhakara seems to be an advocate of "rationalism and rigourism".

Kumarila differs from Prabhakara in his concept of duty. Jaimini, the founder of the Mimamsa, has defined Dharma as "a good which is of the nature of a command. It is a command which leads to the attainment of the highest good". It is a prescription of the Vedas which indicates what is good and what is evil, and impels the self to realize its highest good. Kumarila difines Dharma as "a command of the Vedas which impels the self to act". What leads to the attainment of good is dharma. The performance of rituals is conducive to happiness. Duties are of two types, 'dos' and 'don'ts': injunctions and prohibitions. To abstain from the evil is as much dharma as doing the good. For the failure to abstain from evil leads to suffering. The act of killing leads to intense

suffering in the hell. Kumarila regards the external acts enjoined or prohibited by the Vedas as Dharma. As such he advocates the ethics of ritualism and ceremonialism. He holds a "legalistic view of morality". But the duties are not the commands of a superior person. Kumarila advocates non-secular egoistic hedonism and perfectionism. Empirical duties are conducive to happiness of the individual in heaven or on the earth. Unconditional duties are conducive to liberation. Kumarila however repudiates Utilitarianism. Rightness or wrongness of an action is not to be determined by reference to indidual's or others' happiness. It is decided in the light of Vedic injunctions. He holds that what is good has the character of Dharma and is distinctly enjoined by the Vedas.

The Mimamsakas recognize two kinds of duties: secular and scriptural. The former fulfil perceptible secular ends; the latter fulfil imperceptible non-sensuous ends. The latter are of two kinds: conditional and unconditional. The former are empirical duties such as duties incidental to one's station. The latter are obligatory duties. Kumarila holds Dharma as an external act ; Prabhakara does not. Kumarila thinks that the prescribed duties derive their authoritativeness from the Vedas; Prabhakara thinks that it is derived from Apurva. "Kumarila thinks that the relation of the Imperative to the agent is that of causation or becoming; to Prabhakara, it is a unique relation of a command to the agent commanded".

The Mimasmsa system emphasises the ritualistic aspect of the Vedas. It is their firm belief that the acts enjoined by the Vedas, when performed, lead to happiness. As an instance, we may quote that the performance of Jyotishtoma sacrifice would lead to happiness in heaven. It implies therefore, that the performance of the duties is followed by its fruits at much later times. Now if acts are to be performed at one time and their fruits to be enjoyed much later, what is there to connect the two? The Purva Mimamsa's answer is, "Apurva". The Apurva is the link between the two. Apurva is thus a **tertium quid** between the performed act and its deferred fulfilment.

Kumarila and Prabhakara hold divergent views on the nature of Apurva. According to Kumarila it is the capability in the principal action, or in the agent, which was non-existent prior to the performance of the action and its existence is proved by the authority of the Vedas. The performance creates a positive force or a capacity (Apurva) by virtue of which one attains heaven. As observed by Dr. G.N. Jha, the completion of sacrifice produces "a certain potency in the agent". Without the hypothesis of Apurva no connection can be established between the performance and its consequential fruit.

Prabhakara rejects Kumarila's view. A prescribed act is transient. It cannot establish any final

result at a subsequent time. The Apurva according to him is 'Ought' or duty, which is different from the act. The Apurva is to be accomplished by the self's volition. All volitions are determined by 'Ought'. To him it is the Moral Imperative. However, it is difficult to understand how Apurva can lead the self to the final result of the act done by it.

Theory of Knowledge :

In discussing Epistemology of the Mimamsa system one is struck by their theory of self validity of knowledge (Svatahpramanyavada). Kumarila recognizes six pramanas: perception, inference, comparison, Vedic testimony, postulation and non-perception. Prabhakara, the other exponent of the Mimamsa system, accepts the first five but rejects the last viz., non-perception. Kumarila holds that the cognitive act is inferred from cognizedness in the object. Prabhakara on the other hand thinks that the self, the cognition and the object are perceived simultaneously in every act of cognition. These differences persist in their approach to the problem of knowledge.

The broad view about the validity of knowledge is that whenever there are sufficient conditions for the generation of a particular kind of knowledge, there arises knowledge containing an element of belief in the object known. If there is a broad day light, an object is very near me and it comes in contact with

my eyes, (all these being sufficient conditions), I perceive that object, i.e. I have a knowledge of it accompanied by a belief in the object I perceive. When we hear a trustworthy person speaking a meaningful sentence, we have knowledge from his testimony. When the required conditions are absent, e.g. absence of light or a case of a jaundiced eye, the knowledge in that case fails to generate belief. From this, two conclusions are drawn by the Mimamsakas. The validity of knowledge arises from the very conditions that give rise to that knowledge and not from any extra conditions **(Pramanyam svatah utpadyate);** the validity of knowledge is also believed in or known as soon as the knowledge arises. Hence the belief does not depend upon the verification of knowledge by some other knowledge. **(pramanyam svatah jnayate ca).** This Mimamsa doctrine with its double implication is known as the theory of Svatahpramanyavada or the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge.

In short, the Mimamsakas hold that knowledge is valid in itself and the truth is self-evident. Kumarila says "validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object; it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of an object". The validity of knowledge is intrinsic. The causes of knowledge should be untainted by defects. One can easily appreciate the bearing of such view on the authority of the Vedas. The Vedas are Apaurusheya. Hence the knowledge contained in the Vedas can not be contradicted. The conditions of knowledge

are present and therefore, the knowledge contained in them is infallible. Knowledge is **per se** valid.

Prabhakara also holds that all knowledge is valid in itself. All cognitions as cognitions are valid. Their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of the object. Thus when I see a serpant in place of a rope my cognition of a serpant, as my cognition, is valid but the knowledge is considered erroneous because my knowledge of it as a serpanet does not agree with the real nature of the object which is a rope. Thus both Kumarila and Prabhakara recognize the intrinsic validity of knowledge.

The bearing of the self validity of knowledge on the Mimamsaka view of the authority of the Vedas is that they contend that knowledge contained in them is not and can not be contradicted by any other knowledge. Hence it is true. Secondly, since the Vedas are Apauruseya, the conditions of knowledge are also beyond error and so the authority of the Vedas is infallible.

Every philosopher is confronted with the problem of error. That system which can successfully explain the problem of error, can be said to have resolved all doubts. As regards the Mimamsa theory of knowledge we have to accept that it is realistic. According to both Kumarila and Prabhakara, there is no knowledge which does not point to a corresponding

object outside it. All knowledge is assumed to be true and it requires verification only when there arises a doubt. However, novelty is a necessary condition of knowledge and hence memory or recollection cannot be regarded as knowledge.

Now if all experience by its very nature is valid, it may be asked, how can we explain an error ? Kumarila and Prabhakara differ in their answers to this question. Kumarila's answer is known as **Viparita Khyati:** (an error is a sort of mal-observation) and Prabhakara's answer is known as **Akhyati:** (an error is a sort of non-observation).

Viparita-khyati : Khyati means knowledge and Viparita-khyati means false or distorted knowledge. When we observe (wrongly) a serpent in place of a rope what is it that happens? According to Kumarila, in this, something is directly given viz. the 'this' but the serpent is not given. That is the presentative content is there but the representative one is not. All experience is analysable into **'this'** and **'what'**. In an error the two factors are wrongly synthesised. While the two experiences should be taken separately, they are fused into one whole and there lies the error. The serpent and the rope should be perceived separately but when they are perceived together as one there arises an error. Here, the error is that of commission. "It includes as its content more than there is warrant for in the reality that is presented". In the words of

Hiriyanna, "Illusion here is explained as a **unitary** knowledge instead of as two jnanas". Thus in an erroneous perception of a rajju sarpa, the two relate, viz., the rope and the serpent are actually given. But whereas they should be seen separately they are perceived as a unitary whole. Hence the serpent instead of appearing separately shows itself in the rope and makes it appear differently (Viparita) from what it is. Epistemologically, this view, though more consistent with the realistic stand, presents a difficulty of the inclusion of an ideal element in the content of knowledge. Knowledge, however inadequate, says Kumarila, does not go beyond reality. In short an error is a "partial misrepresentation".

Akhyati : The word akhyati literally means "no knowledge". However, it is used to indicate Prabhakara's theory of error. According to him error is not "a unit of knowledge, but a composit of two jnanas". Now when we wrongly perceive a serpent in place of rope what really happens is, we perceive 'this' and also certain features of the serpent which it possesses in common with a rope. The knowledge of those common features recalls to our mind the impression of a past experience, i.e. our past recollection of a serpent. Perception is immediately followed by memory. Of these two jnanas, the first is true as far as it goes. But the second is not found in the given context. The former puts forward a claim to validity, the latter does not. According to Prabhakara, knowledge

can never contradict its logical nature and there is consequently no error (Akhyati). **"We simply overlook the fact that they are two jnanas".** Consequently we fail to notice the separateness of their respective objects. It is a kind of non-observation. However, mere failure to know will not suffice to explain an error. Otherwise error would occur in dreamless sleep which is also characterised by absence of knowledge. An error according to Prabhakara is a partial or incomplete knowledge. There are two factors necessary to cause an error: positive and negative — the partial knowledge of things presentd and the failure to note the distinction between them. Prabhakara takes up a different standpoint to explain error since like Kumarila, he cannot do so from a purely logical point of view. He regards all knowledge as a means to an end. It must prompt activity. The function of knowledge is to guide activity. From the point of view of practical utility, error can be distinguished from truth. The latter works the other does not. A real snake would bite, a snake in place of a rope would not. In short, Kumarila's attitude towards knowledge is scientific; that of Prabhakara is pragmatic.

The Vedic Testimony

The distinguishing feature of the Mimamsa system is its adherence to the Vedas as an infallible authority in itself. In this the Mimamsakas differ from others in that they place the Vedas or Sruti on a

footing peculiarly of its own. The Mimamsakas maintain that these revealed truths come to us in the form of words whose interpretation is not easy. Hence the need to explain the methods of right sort of interpretations. The aim and object of the Mimamsa is to make clear the true import of the Vedas.

The main object of the Mimamsa is to establish the authority of the Vedas not on dogmatic considerations but on rational grounds. The testimony of the Vedas is a means to know the truth. And its value consists in the fact that like other pramanas it is just a pramana. The Vedas are Apauruseya and they are self-existent. Secondly, the Vedas are silent on their authorship. Therefore, their source is not human but divine. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila equate the Vedas with Sabdapramana. However, Kumarila holds that all words point to an existent something or something that is yet to be established. Prabhakara limits its scope to things yet to be accomplished.

Kumarila holds that the testimony depends upon the trustworthy source. It is not valid in itself. Non-contradiction is the test of truth. The Vedic testimony is valid because it is not contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. Since its source is divine, it is free from the defects of the knowledge of objects which are, all within the range of sense perception. Prabhakara does not recognize human testimony. Hence there is

no testimony other than the scriptural testimony. Only the Vedas are testimony. Human testimony is inference which is open to error. Prabhakara also relies on the non-human source of the Vedas as the ground of its validity. The Vedas comprehend objects which can not be comprehended by any other pramanas. The sentences in the Vedas manifest their own meaning by their inherent powers. He regards the Vedic testimony as only verbal authority.

Arthapapatti means presumption. It is an act of postulating something to account for what apparently clashes with experience and is therefore, in the nature of hypothesis. Sometimes two rival theories are equally plausible, but appear mutually incompatible. In such cases a presumption is to be made. It is defined as "assumption of some unperceived fact in order to reconcile some inconsistency in perceived facts". For instance, on seeing that Mr. X, who is known to be alive, is not at home, one presumes that he must have gone out. This is considered as a valid method of discovering the unknown from the known. But at best it remains an inference. Prabhakara holds that there must be a doubt as to the truth of the two irreconcilable facts of perception. The presumption helps to remove the doubt. According to Kumarila, doubt is not the basis of presumption. The basis is the mutual inconsistency of the two well ascertained facts. This is the difference between presumption and inference, and hence pre-

sumption should not be treated simply as an inference.

Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension): Shavara regards non-apprehension as an indepedent means of valid knowledge. It is a specific pramana by which negation is known, e.g. the absence of a jar on my table. The Mimamsakas admit negative facts and also formulate a separate pramana for knowing them. Anupalabdhi means the "absence of apprehension". Absence can indicate non-existence if it is aided by the mental presentation of the relevant object. The knowledge of negation is perpetual. No sensory contact is present or no organ of sense is functioning. Non-existence is real. There are four kinds of non-existence: prior and posterior non-existence; mutual and absolute non-existence.

But Prabhakara, like some Vaisesikas, does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent means of knowledge. He does not accept anupalabhdi as a distinct means of knowledge. He rejects non-existence as an ontological reality and anupalabdhi as a distinct source of knowledge.

The Concept of Self:

The conception of Atman is somewhat different in the two schools headed by Kumarila and Prabhakara. Kumarila's view is very much like the Nyaya-Vaisesika view. The self is both an agent

(Karta) and enjoyer (Bhokta). But he admits change of form in the self. Though it undergoes modification, it remains eternal. Knowledge is the mode of the self. The self is omnipresent and is in relation to all existing objects. In sleep the self endures, but it is characterized by the potency to know. We know the self through the aham-prayatna i.e. I-notion. Kumarila understands self-consciousness literally, and holds that the self can be at once both subject and object.

Prabhakara differs from Kumarila in two important respects. He does not accept that the self can suffer change. Again he objects to the contention that the self is "knowable". For the agent and object can never be the same, in one act. The self is of the nature of subject and remains as such in all knowledge. If it were not so there would be no difference between the knowledge of two persons. The self is not eternal. It appears and disappears. Conciousness is an accidental quality of the self.

The self is born in different bodies owing to merit and demerit. Final release can be secured by the complete destruction of the self's contact with the body and the sense organs. And this contact can be destroyed by the complete disappearance of merit and demerit. On the disappearance of merit and demerit the self loses all consciousness and is divsted of cognition. The self should therefore, be directed towards

the performance of duties enjoined by the Vedas. Kumarila's view of liberation does not substantially differ from that of Prabhakara.

God and the Good :

As pointed out by J. Sinha, "The Mimamsa teaches ritualistic morality and religion". The performance of rituals generates apurva, i.e. potency in the soul which leads to the attainment of the desired goal. This presupposes a belief in many deities to whom the sacrifices are to be made. However, it should be remembered that it is neither the particular deity nor the God that gives the rewards. Their intervention is not necessary for sacrifices to bring forth any fruit. These deities are only beings in whose name sacrifices are to be made. They are not objects of worship. They are non-existent. They have existence only in the mantras. The Mimamasakas refer to a number of gods and deities. This would suggest a sort of polytheism. They are beyond space and time revealed only in the mantras. From this account it would appear that the Mimamsa is a strange admixture of the heterodox and the orthodox. It believes in the Vedas but it militates against making God interfere with the order of the universe. Jaimini does not even refer to God. Kumarila and Prabhakara deny the existence of God as the creator and destroyer of the world. The Mimamsa believes in polytheism but is not theistic in the concept of God. The deities do not serve any practical purpose. They

are not even the objects of worship. Prabhakara even argues that God is not the author of the Vedas. He is not the moral Governor. God thus remains an unwarranted hypothesis. It seems the later Mimamsakas smuggled the concept of God. It looks as if the Mimamsa is atheistic despite its polytheism. "In its anxiety to maintan the supremacy of the Vedas, the Mimamsakas relegate God to an ambiguous position".

In the Mimamsa discussion, the highest good appears to have been the attainment of heaven, a state in which there is unalloyed bliss. It is the final end of the usual rituals as enjoined by the Vedas. Gradually, this conception in the hands of Kumarila and Prabhakara was replaced by the concept of liberation. Nisreyasa (freedom from bondage) became the highest good. By the disinterested performance of the rituals, Karma-ties are cut asunder and there is no rebirth. As such there is no contact between the body and the self. The self is divested of cognition and it is an end of all suffering and pain. Liberation is an unconscious state of the self free from pleasure and pain. Nisreyasa is desirable not as a state of bliss, but as the total cessation of pain. It is the self remaining in its intrinsic nature.

CHAPTER VI

THE AVAITA VEDANTA OF SANKARA (788-820 A.D.) AND THE VISISTADVAITA OF RAMANUJA (1017-1137 A.D.)

The word "Vedanta" literally means, "the end-portion of the Vedas". Accordingly, it indicates a reference to the teachings of the Upanishads. The Upanishads speak with a double voice and thus stand in need of some reconciliation. Badarayana first attempted such reconciliation and systematization in his Brahma-Sutra. That is the basis on which the writers on the Vedanta have relied and there is a long line of commentators who have interpreted these sutras on different lines. The chief among these commentators are Sankara and Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha. These Acharyas wielded enormous influence on the Hindu society at different times. However, the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara has remained the most widely influential school. We are mainly concerned here with the unqualified monism of Sankara and the qualified monism of Ramanuja. Both the systems are idealistic. However, the former is out and out logical; the latter is a mingling of metaphysics and theology. The two systems start with the analysis of experience which inevitably points out to the underlying principle of consciousness. The essence of the Absolute, which according to Sankara

is the only reality, is consciousness. Reality is one and does not admit any distinctions. Ramanuja accepts the distinctions but holds that they can not be conceived apart from the ultimate reality which is the Absolute.

The Ultimate Reality:

In the various orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, Sankara's Advaita Vedanta occupies a unique position. It has not only been widely influential philosophical system of the Hindus but also impressive in its intellectual appeal, and penetrating logical analysis. Of the various branches of the Vedanta school, Sankara's advaita Vedanta is a thorough going monistic interpretation of the Upanisads. Reality, said Sankara, must be one without a second, and that One Reality he called Brahman (Absolute). **"Brahama satyam"** — Brahaman alone is real.

Thus Brahman is the only ontological reality. "It is the supreme, perfect, absolute reality". If there is anything real, logic demands, that it should be free from contradiction. It should not be subject to change. For that which is begotten in time is destined to die, and that which changes and dies cannot be real. Strictly speaking such a reality cannot be defined. For, to define is to limit. And how can one set limits to the unlimited? However, we can imagine the nature of Brahman in words though such description would not exhaust Brahman.

Brahman is Truth, Existence, Consciousness, Infinite, Bliss. Really speaking, Brahman is attributeless (Nirguna). For to say that Brahman has attributes amounts to rejecting monism. For, the Reality that is One, is without any distinctions. Yet we may imagine its essence. It is **sat** i.e. Existence; it is **chid**, i.e. Consciousness and it is **anand**, i.e. Bliss. Existence, consciousness and bliss constitute its essence (Svaruplakshana). They distinguish Brahman from the world-appearance which is unreal, non-intelligent and of the nature of pain.

Brahman is the being of all beings. It is pure, and transcendental. It is formless (Nirakara), attributeless (Nirguna). It is free from negation, mutation and limitation. It is free from all determinations (nirvisesa) and conditions (nirupadhi). It is infinite, without any beginning or end (Anandi ananta). It is beyond space and time. It is devoid of homogeneous, heterogeneous and internal differences (Sajatiya vijatiya svagata-bheda sunya). It is omnipresent and omniscient. It is the eternal, transcendental consciousness devoid of the distinction of knowledge, known and the knower. It is impersonal or supra-personal, since personality implies the distinction between self and not-self. Brahman is eternally fulfilled, fully accomplished and perfect reality. It is really indeterminate, and the last word on Brahman is 'neti neti' (not this; not this). Such is Sankara's concept of Brahman. It has a dazzling brilliance. But it has no emotional appeal.

It seems that Sankara's monistic view of Brahman, dictated by the necessity of logic failed to meet the demands of heart. It was too abstract and too impersonal to satisfy a man with a devotional bent of mind. As such, Ramanuja rose in revolt against this contentless, formal Brahman which blinded the onlooker by its dazzling brilliance. Hence he evolved a different conception of Branman.

Ramanuja's Brahman is the Supreme person (Purusottama) endowed with innumerable supreme and auspicious qualities (saguna) and devoid of all impurities. It is existence, consciousness and bliss. But it is not one that devours all distinctions like that of Sanskara. It only means that nothing is complete without reference to Brahman. Everything is real in and through Brahman. It is determinate whole (Saguna) as against Sankara's indeterminate whole. Brahman is identical with God; with Sankara, God is an appearance and he cannot be identical with Brahman. He is the inner self of unconscious matter and conscious souls. He is the bridge that leads all souls to immortality. He is possessed of supreme power (Sakti) and knowledge to create, preserve and destroy the world. The matter and souls co-inhere in the Brahman. These may be considered as modes and there is an inseparable relation between him and the modes. He does not lose his integrity in the midst of diversity of his appearances. Out of his fullness he creates the world for his own sport. He

is the One that does the adjustments towards the moral deserts of the individual jivas. He is the presiding power over the community of finite souls. He is the moral benefactor and is merciful to those who approach him in devotion.

The World-Appearance :

If Brahman alone is real, what becomes of the world of objects in which we live, move and have our being? It would be but natural to suggest that it is not real. Sankara has boldly carried his thesis to its logical conclusion in saying that Brahman alone is real; the world is unreal (**Brahma satyam; jaganmitthya**). And it is this part of his philosophy that has come under severe criticism. The critics have raised a hornets' nest over the words maya and mithya without trying really to understand what Sankara wanted to drive at.

The world around us consisting of names and forms (Namarupa) is regarded as an appearance. The empirical world, as it is rightly described by Sinha, is "the abode of empirical agents, acts and their fruits." The empirical world is really a world-appearance. It is superimposed on the only reality that is Brahman. The world of objects is affected by duality. It is subject to change. And hence this time-begotten and death-destined world is mere maya. Its reality is not genuine. It appears as real; but in fact, is not so. It is as real as a snake which appears

in place of a rope. And even as all illusions have a basis so also the world appearance has a basis. It is again Brahman. On the face of it such a conclusion may appear startling and even confusing. But on deeper analysis it would be realised that he was not trying to explain away the world but was trying to evolve a world-view which would not be stultified by any other kind of experience.

In the first place, it is wrong to think that the word "mithya" (unreal) which Sankara uses to describe the external world is synonymous with non-existence. The world certainly is **asat.** But it does not mean "non-existent". In this connection, Sankara draws a distinction between different degrees of reality. For instance, we would say that a "horn of a hare", and "a lotus of the sky" are unreal. Here the word unreal indicates non-existence. But we do not classify dreams in the same category of unreal even though we call them unreal. No one would be rash enough to deny reality to dreams, however transient, they may be. It needs no argument to prove this point. For one may simply recall one's own dreams. And yet we do not treat our experience in our dreams as reality. The obvious reason being that our dream experience is stultified by our waking experience. Sankara would argue that dreams are real so long as we are dreaming, but their unreality becomes patent when the focus of waking experience lights our mind. Why not

imagine that the same thing would happen to our waking experience if our mind was illumined by a flood of light in the form of Brahmajnana? In that case, Brahmajnana constitutes a higher kind of experience in the light of which our waking experience appears merely as a prolonged dream. But as long as we have not attained that level of experience, the world experiences, to all intents and purposes, remain as real as real can be. Hence when Sankara describes the world as mithya he does not mean that it is non-existent like a lotus of the sky; nor does he mean that it is absolutely unreal. He only means to assert that "the world is relatively real". It is empirically real. It is different from pratibhasika satta, and also different from paramarthika satta, for it has only "vyavaharika satta" This would mean that as considered from the transcendental point of view, the world is unreal. But the world has a pragmatic reality. So long as we are on the empirical level, the world is quite real to us. As long as we are on the empirical level (Vyavaharika satta) the world is as real as the paper on which this matter is printed. Brahman being the only ontological reality, the world can have pragmatic reality. The world of objects has a higher reality as compared to the absolutely illusory objects. But it cannot have the same reality as compared to the transcendental reality of Brahman. The whole world subsists in Brahman, which alone is really real.

It is significant to observe, that with the dawn of Brahmic consciousness, the darkness of belief in the reality of a relatively real world is dispelled. But that does not mean that our world ceases to exist. It is simply charged with a new meaning. If one remembers this, so much dust that is raised on Sankara's mayavada will settle down. One is reminded of Berekely who said, "We raise the dust and complain that we cannot see".

Reality and Appearance:

Sankara has all along maintained that Brahman alone is the reality and the world is an appearance. Naturally the question would arise as to how the two are related. Sankara advocates the theory of superimposition (Adhyasa) to explain this relationship. The entire world of objects subsists in Brahman. Brahman is the ground; the world is the consequent. The world therefore, has no reality of its own. There is causation in the empirical world but there is no causation in Brahman which is the only ontological reality.

Thus Sankara does not believe in real change. He advocates Vivartavada (Theory of apparent change) to explain the relationship between Brahman and the world. When we see a snake in place of a rope, the snake is not a reality but a projection of an ignorant mind. The rope alone is real. Similarly it is our mind which is enveloped in nescience that

projects the world in place of Brahman. Where there is Brahman we see a world instead. An effect does not exist apart from a cause, even so the world has no reality apart from Brahman. So long as we are on the empirical level the world is real, just as the snake is real to us as long as we have not discovered that it is a rope. Again, the world partakes in the nature of Brahman, just as the golden ornaments partake in the nature of gold.

Maya and Avidya:

Sankara uses the two words — maya and avidya — almost synonymously. Broadly speaking, we can imagine the difference between the two by calling them as objective and subjective principles of illusion. Sankara is already committed to the view that the world is an appearance. But this may prompt one to ask as to how that illusion is caused. Sankara's answer would be that maya and avidya are the causes of illusion.

Maya which is a frequently used word in the Vedic literature is often conceived as power or energy of God—a device by which he creates the world. To Sankara, it is a source of the phenomenal world of names and forms. But Sankara describes Maya as indescribable (Anirvachaniya). It is neither existent nor non-existent, it is neither different nor non-different. Hence indescribable. God himself is enveloped by maya. For it is because of maya that

Brahman appears as Ishvara. In the last analysis, even God is reduced to a level of mere appearance. Ishvara himself imagines different forms in himself in and through maya. Like Brahman, maya is beginningless, and does not exist apart from Brahman. It is something indescribable which is responsible in making souls perceive a world-appearance in place of Brahman. The world is an imaginary construction of maya. Maya is not an independent principle like Prakrti. It is called avyakta, since it can not be defined as real or unreal.

Avidya is the adjunct of jiva. It is perceived in the forms, 'I am ignorant', 'I do not know'. 'The Jiva is a reflection of Brahman in avidya. Avidya is translated as nescience. The later Advaitins tried to distinguish between maya and avidya. Ajnana is of two kinds — maya and avidya. Maya is made of pure sattva, avidya is made of impure sattva. Maya is the adjunct of Ishvara, avidya is an adjunct of jiva. Maya has a power of projection. It projects the world appearance in place of Brahman. Avidya on the other hand has a power of concealing the true nature of Brahman. Avidya can be regarded as a subjective principle of illusion; while maya is an objective principle of illusion. The nescience in maya is of consmic nature while in avidya it is of individual nature. The jiva bound by avidya can not know its true nature which is Brahman itself and the bound jivas are reborn at the time of recreation to exhaust what is in store for them.

Ishvara :

There are many critics who have reacted violently on reading Sankara's philosophy. It is not so much due to his advocacy of the theory of illusion (mayavada) as to his concept of God. Ordinarily barring the exception of an atheist, one would recoil at the belief that God is consigned to the limbo of appearance. Sankara has defined God as **'Maya visista chaitanya'**. It means that God is consciousness or spirit enveloped by maya. For maya is an adjunct of Ishvara. In this respect, God becomes Saguna Brahma.

Sankara's view amounts to denying the transcendental reality to God. However, on empirical level God has a reality, though in the final analysis, he is relatively real. From the pragmatic standpoint, God is the creator of the world. He sustains it and destroys it. He is omnipotent and omniscient being. From this stand point he is consciousness, real and infinite. In his conception of Ishvara, he tries to combine immanence and transcendence of God. On the empirical level the world subsists in God. He is in the world and yet beyond it. God is an object of worship and an ideal of devotee only when looked at from the empirical stand point. Though considered from the higher point of view of Brahman, God is thus an appearance, his importance and value should not be ignored. Worship of God has the greatest redeeming value from the spiritual standpoint.

The relation between Ishvara and Brahman can be realised when it is observed that the former is Brahman conditioned by maya. Ishvara is the supreme person. Brahman is the supreme reality. All the adjuncts on which depends the existence of Ishvara are destroyed when there is Brahmajnana. In other words, the knowledge of Brahman transforms the relative reality of Ishvara. For, Ishvara has only an empirical reality; Brahman has an ontological reality. "Ishvara is the effect of Brahman". With reference to creation it may be said that Brahman is pure Being; Ishvara is Becoming.

The theories concerning mayavada and Ishvara have a direct bearing on the advaita ethics and religion. For, if the world around us is phenomenal and illusory and Ishvara also, a being conditioned by maya, the principle of objective illusion, what becomes of our moral efforts and religious beliefs ? Are they not reduced to shambles ? For if the world is an appearance, what value is there to such distinctions as good and bad ? And after all Brahman which does not admit of any distinctions is beyond good and evil. What then is the final end of our moral action ? Can there be any incentive to our moral life under such conditions ? Such questions naturally arise in the mind of one who ponders over Sankara's Brahman. Similarly, if God, who is the culminating point of religion and also its axiom, is to be an appearance, is not religion reduced to a farce?

Doubts such as these do call for an elucidation of Sankara's point of view.

It may be observed that it is mostly the Western critics, having an abiding faith in Christianity, who have viewed Sankara's doctrines with certain preconceived notions. As Christianity is founded upon the dualism of man and God, any theory that tries to preach the identity between the two is likely to offend their religious sense. To conceive God as an appearance strikes at the root of Christianity. We cannot ignore this bias of the Western critics who declare that there is no room for ethics or religion in the advaita Vedanta. In a sense, Hinduism, in making the Absolute the highest reality and its experience a crowning grace of life, rises above Christianity. To Sankara, religion could never be ultimate nor could it be a set of dogmas. It is essentially a living experience and to have that experience is the supreme ideal towards the realization of which man should direct all his energies. It is not true that in advaita vedanta there is no room for religion. In the first place, it preaches a kind of higher and universal religion and it maintains that all sectarian religions have only an empirical reality. Sankara's own example amply proves that if he had denied religion he would never have been in a position to stem the rising tide of Buddhism, and himself become a powerful champion of Hinduism.

What is true of religion is also true of ethics. So long as we are on the empirical level, all moral distinctions have meaning and moral efforts are necessary. Even to reach the stage of Brahmic consciousness, an intense moral effort is necessary. Sankara's own life is the finest example of intense moral life. Besides, his mayavada was not a refuge for pessimists and inactive persons. It did postulate higher values like jivanmukti which would be impossible of attainment without intense moral effort.

It is therefore, wrong to assume that there is no place for religion or ethics in the advaita Vedanta of Sankara.

The Concept of Self:

Sankara's philosophy can be summed up in his own words: **"Brahma satyam jaganmithya jivobrahmaiva na parah"** It means Brahman alone is real; the world is an appearance and the soul is not different from Brahman. This puts in a nutshell Sankara's concept of the self. If the self is not different from Brahman, it must be of the nature of Brahman and must be related to it in identity. This is the logical outcome of Sankara's absolute monism.

The Atman is the supreme universal self. It is non-dual in character; it is partless and omnipresent. Its essence is consciousness in its pristine purity. The jiva i.e. the individual self is the Atman limited or

individuated by the adjuncts of the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect and the ego. In short, jiva is the empirical self and stands for the psycho-physical organism. Sankara holds that Atman is one but it appears variously as individual jivas owing to its limiting adjuncts (upadhis). The jiva is Atman limited by avidya. When avidya is destroyed, only the empirical self i.e. jiva vanishes and the reality of the all abiding Atman persists. As an empirical self the jiva is a knower and enjoyer. It lives in the body which is its prison-house. It is subject to transmigration and hence capable of bondage and liberation. The difference between the jiva and the Atman is only phenomenal. Sankara's jiva is thus an embodied self. It sustains the vital forces and controls the physical body. The self is capable of different modifications such as a dreaming self; a sleeping self the intuitive self. The last one is the reflection of Atman. The Atman is the witness which reveals the jiva. The Atman is eternal, immutable and indestructible.

One of the most vexed questions in Sankara's philosophy is the relation between the jiva and the Brahman. Sankara preaches absolute identity between the two. The statement of identity is either tautological or impossible. For, each jiva who has many adjuncts and who is limited can not be identical with the principle of reality without adjuncts and which is limitless. What then is the meaning of the aphorism, "**That Thou Art**"?

Sankara interpreted this not as an identity between a finite man and infinite God. He urged the thinkers to go beyond the empirical reality and understand the true meaning of the words, "That" and "Thou". The "Thou" stands for the essence of jiva without adjuncts i.e. pure consciousness. He is referring not to the jiva but to Atman and the "That" represents Brahman not as it appears as an external world of objects empirically, but as **"sadchidanand"** which it is transcendentally. If we take both the jiva and Brahman empirically there is no identity. But if we comprehend their essence transcendentally there is absolute identity between them. In this Sankara is evolving absolute idealism or unqualified spiritualistic monism. For, it is the principle of consciousness that permeates throughout all the levels of existence. The jiva identifies itself with different things at different times but one thing that is common is consciousness. Similarly, the Brahman appears as the manifold world, but its essence is consciousness. Therefore, the two in their real essence, are identical.

Moksha :

The major premise of Sankara's philosophy appears to be the absolute identity between the self and the Brahman. Naturally anything that falls short of that is ignorance. And all actions on the emperical level are founded on ignorance because they do not imply a vision of the identity between the jiva and the Brahman. Hence all bondage arises

out of nescience in which the soul associates itself with the gross body and its actions. Only the knowledge of its true nature can cut asunder the knots of bondage of ignorance. This knowledge, that brings about release, is Brahmavidya.

The distinctive feature of the Vedant concept of liberation is the positive approach it has towards it. Liberation is not the production of anything new. It reorients the older beliefs. It is the realization of **"I am Brahman".** Then all the illusory distinctions disappear and the self realises its own nature. This state is not a negative one as it is preached in the Nyaya Vaisesika system. It is a state of positive bliss (Ananda) to be enjoyed here and now and not in any hypothetical hereafter. It should not be imagined that to one who is liberated the world ceases to exist. Far from that, it acquires a new meaning for him. It gives him the highest bliss he can experience by being in communion with the Supreme reality. This state he can enjoy even when he is living (jivan mukti) and the same state will continue even in a disembodied state. (Videha mukti).

In short, it is the study of Vedanta that helps man see through appearances and work for Brahmavidya which alone can bring liberation. To attain Brahmavidya, the mind needs to be prepared for it. It cannot be simply done by practising certain rituals. According to Sankara, the preparation necessary for

tuning the mind for that attainment is fourfold. Firstly, the spiritual aspirant should be able to discriminate between what is eternal and what is not eternal. This he calls **(Nityanitya vastuviveka).** The second qualification requisite for Brahmavidya is that he should give up all desires for enjoyment of objects here and hereafter (**Bhogavairaga**). Thirdly, he should be able to control his mind and the senses; and through this control he should develop patience, power, detachment and concentration (**Samadhi-sadhana-sampat**). Finally, he should have an ardent desire for liberation **(Mumuksattva).** When he satisfies all these four requisite qualifications the Guru i.e. the teacher can initiate him; and he should contemplate on the truth, 'I am Brahman' till he realizes the truth of it. That is the way to attain liberation by knowledge (Jnananmoksha).

Sankara and Ramanuja:

Before concluding this chapter, we may state the differences between Sankara and Ramanuja on the common topics with which they deal. Broadly speaking, the two systems differ in their approach to the philosophic topics mentioned in the Vedas. Both the systems declare that they are correctly interpreting the Vedas. However, Sankara's arguments develop an unqualified monism; whereas, Ramanuja's arguments evolve a qualified monism. Sankara's conception of reality (Brahman) is that it is without any distinctions. It is a nirguna Brahma. Ramanuja, on the

other hand, conceives reality (Brahman) as organic whole inclusive of parts. Hence he conceives a saguna Brahma.

Consequently, Ramanuja differs from Sankara in his conception of maya, the self and liberation. To Ramanuja creation is real, and the created world is as real as Brahman. But he adds that the world cannot be conceived apart from Brahman, hence its reality can be conceived in and through Brahman. For him, maya is not a principle of objective illusion. But it is the God's power of creating the multifarious world He holds—and in this he differs from Sankara—that there is no illusory object. Brahman pervades the entire world.

To Sankara, God is an appearance. To Ramanuja, God is the absolute reality possessed of attributes in the form of matter and soul. The Asbolute One contains the many. The Unity has real parts. God has all good qualities, and he is determinate (Saguna Brahma). God creates the world, sustains it and destroys it. He is the unmanifested cause of the world. He becomes manifested in the form of souls and the world of objects. Ramanuja develops a kind of theism. His God is both immanent and transcendent. He is the object of worship, the aim of our moral effort and the goal of our religious aspiration. We please God through prayer and attain salvation by his grace. It can be observed that Sankara on the

other hand, in his concept of God, transcends theism and attains the height of absolutism.

As regards the self and liberation, Sankara preached identity between the self and the Brahman and made Brahmavidya alone the pathway to liberation. Ramanuja differs from Sankara in both these views. Ramanuja holds that between self and God there is identity as well as difference. Man is finite and thus can never attain complete identity with Brahman the infinite, though both of them may be of the nature of consciousness. Besides, Ramanuja who believes in Bhaktimarga (cult of devotion) thinks that such an identity as preached by Sankara, is irreligious. The devotee takes pleasure in being the servant of God. His object can never be to be God himself. He holds that man partakes the nature of God. For, in his heart there dwells divinity. In the dictum 'That Thou art", the 'That' stands for Brahman and the 'Thou' for the divinity in man. It is an identity of the two different forms of the same substance. Man has a real body and a real soul. The former is the part of matter, the latter, the part of consciousness, both of which are attributes of God. In his view, "There is no loss of personality but loss in personality". The liberated soul is like God but not identical with God.

Unlike Sankara who holds that liberation is through knowledge alone, Ramanuja holds that it can be attained through work and knowledge. By

work he understands rituals enjoined by the Vedas, and their disinterested performance. He also gives Bhakti (devotion) and worship their proper share in working out a way to liberation. The constant meditation of God should be practised by taking it as the dearest object of love. He does not believe in Jivan mukti as Sankara does. The soul that is liberated by the grace of God, is freed from body for ever without any chance of rebirth.

In fine, one who has gone through the the pages of this scanty account of the six systems of Indian philosophy will not fail to appreciate that the idea of moksha is the kernel of the teachings of every system. Everything in this universe is meant to uphold the law of fulfilment. Man, above all, must never lose sight of his destination. He lives, moves and has his being for the express purpose of realising his own true nature. May be, he may not be able to realise it in this life. But he has to come back again and again until he realises **the purpose** and thus justifies the purpose of creation.

कृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

INDEX

Page

Abhava 62, 68, 69
Adhyasa 137
Adrshta 74, 75, 77
Akhyati 121, 122–123
Alaukika 32, 35
Ananda 20
Anumana 31, 38
Anirvachaniya 138
Anupalabdhi 126
Anvayavyatrireki 41
Anyathasiddha 52
Apara 66, 67
Apaurusheya 57
Apavarga 59
Arthapapatti 125
Asamprjnata 103
Asana 98, 99
Asatkaryavada 51–54
Ashtanga yoga 97, 98, 99–102
Asiddha hetu 45
Astika 10
Atheism 94–96
Atman 3, 4, 143–144
Atmavisesa 55
Atomism 71–76
Avayava 30
Avidya 138–139
Avyabhichari 32

	Page
Badarayana	130
Badhita	45
Brahman	3, 4, 131, 132, 133, 134 147, 148
Brahmasutra	130
Categories	62, 63
Chala	30
Chittavrittinirodha	98, 102
Darshana	4, 8, 23
Dharana	98, 101, 112
Dharma	7, 103, 104
Dhyana	98, 101
Dogmatism	13, 14
Dravya	62, 64 – 65
Drshtanta	30
Evolution	82 – 86
Fallacies	45 – 46
Gangesha	29, 36
Gautama	29, 31, 54
God	49, 50, 128, 148
Good	128
Guna	62, 65
Gunas	80, 81
Hetu	38, 39, 48
Hetvabhasa	30, 45 – 46
Inference	38 – 45
Ishvara	140
Ishvarkrishna	79
Ishvarpranidhana	99
Jalpa	30
Jati	30
Jaimini	111

	Page
Jivanmukti	17, 143, 146
Jnanalakshana	36
Kanada	61, 67, 70
Kapila	5, 79
Karma	7, 21, 22, 62, 65
Kevalanvayi	41
Kevalvyatireki	41
Kumarila	111
Kumbhaka	100
Laukika	32, 35
Liberation	21, 23, 26, 58–60, 159
Logical Realism	47
Maya	134, 135, 138–139, 148
Metempsychosis	21, 23
Mimamsa	4, 10, 19, 101
Mithya	134, 135
Moksha	59, 145 –147
Naimittika	112
Nastika	10
Nigamana	39, 44
Nigrahasthana	30
Nirnaya	30
Nirvikalpa	36, 37
Nisreyasa	129
Nityakarma	112
Niyama	98, 99
Nyaya	4, 10, 29
Padartha	62
Paksha	44
Panchshika	79
Paramanu	73

Page

Para 66, 67
Parapara 66, 67
Paramarthika satta 136
Pararthanumana 40
Patanjali 97
Perception . . . . 34 – 38
Pessimism 13, 15, 16
Pluralism 78
Polytheism 4, 128, 129
Prabhakara 111
Prkriti . . 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 90 – 91
Pragmatism 4
Pramanas . . . . 21, 27, 31 – 34
Pranayama 98, 100
Pratibhasika satta 136
Pratyahara 98, 100
Pratijna 39, 44
Pratyaksha 31
Pratyabhijna 37
Puraka 100
Purusa . . 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 91 – 94
Purvavat 40, 41
Ramanuja 130
Realism 46, 50, 78
Rechaka 100
Rigveda 1
Rta 22
Sabda 11, 31
Sabdapramana 11, 12, 13
Sadhya 38, 44
Samadhi 98, 101

Page

Samanya 62, 66
Samanyalakshana 36
Samanyatodrshta 40
Samkhya . . . 4, 10, 18, 79, 80, 85
Samprjnata 103
Samavaya 53, 58, 62, 67
Samsara 21, 22, 48
Samsaya 30
Sankara 5, 130
Santosha 99
Satkaryavada . . . . 86 – 88
Satpratipaksha Hetu 45
Sattva 80
Savikalpa 36, 37
Savyabhichara Hetu 45
Saucha 99
Svadhyaya 99
Svarthanumana 40
Svathpramanyavada 118, 119
Self 47–49, 126–127, 143–145
Sheshavat 40, 41
Syllogism . . . . 41 – 45
Tarka 30
Trigunas 80
Tamas 80
Tapas 99
Uddyotakara 55
Upadana 53
Upanaya 34, 44
Upanishad 1, 2, 3, 22

	Page
Yama	98, 99
Yoga	60, 97
Yoga psychology	104 –106
Yoga theology	106 –109
Vada	30
Vairagya	55
Vaisesika	4, 10, 61, 62
Vaisesika cosmology	76 – 78
Vedanta	130
Vedic testimony	123 –125
Viparitakhyati	121 –122
Viruddha Hetu	45
Visesa	62, 63
Visistadvaita	130
Vitanda	30
Vyapti	39 – 40, 44
Vyavaharika satta	136

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